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Abstract
The present fMRI study is the first that investigates the neural correlates of everyday 
moral decision-making in psychopaths. Patients suffering from psychopathy show an 
emotional detachment as well as an antisocial and often immoral behavior. In contrast to 
the neural correlates of moral reasoning in healthy individuals, the corresponding neural 
correlates  in  psychopaths  are  poorly  understood.  In  the  present  study,  twelve 
psychopathic subjects were presented with 56 verbal stories describing conflicts with 
either moral or neutral content. In the moral conflicts, subjects had to decide between a 
personal-desire guided immoral response and a conflicting moral standard. The neutral 
conflicts  required  a  decision  between  two  conflicting  personal  desires.  On  a  post-
scanning questionnaire, subjects had to indicate their feelings and certainty about each 
conflict.  Behavioral  as  well  as  imaging data  were  compared  to  a  non-psychopathic 
control group consisting of twelve criminal subjects.
On behavioral level, compared to non-psychopathic criminal control subjects,  there 
was  a  statistical  tendency  to  more  immoral  personal  desire-guided  decisions  in 
psychopaths as well as a significantly better feeling when deciding immorally. In the 
fMRI scanning experiment, moral conflicts were compared to neutral conflicts in order 
to identify brain areas related to moral reasoning. In psychopaths, this contrast induced 
higher activity in a neural network that included the medial and superior frontal gyrus, 
the superior temporal gyrus and the posterior cingulate and precuneus region. Further 
analysis  of  the  moral  conflicts  in  psychopaths  revealed  that  immoral  decisions  in 
contrast to moral decisions elicited higher activation in the medial frontal gyrus and in 
the cingulate gyrus. When compared to the activity in the moral > neutral contrast in 
non-psychopathic criminal control subjects, a lack of activation in right-sided middle 
temporal gyrus in psychopaths was revealed.
The results of the present study provide further information about everyday moral 
decision-making and its  neural  underpinnings  in psychopaths.  The study shows that 
processing moral conflicts induces a similar pattern of brain activation in psychopaths 
and  in  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  as  it  is  known  from  healthy 
individuals. As the revealed brain areas are known to be strongly interconnected, the 
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present  findings  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  antisocial  and  impaired  affective 
behavior  that  is  characteristic  for  psychopaths  may  be  due  to  a  deficient 
interconnectivity among the single brain areas in psychopaths. Deficient inputs from 
limbic areas such as the amygdala may lead to a deficiency in emotion processing that 
results in immoral behavior and emotional detachment. As a general conclusion, this 
study  suggests  a  deficient  emotion  processing  mechanism  in  psychopaths  that  is 
reflected by their emotional detachment on behavioral level.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since human life exists on earth, morality and moral decision-making have always been 
important issues in all human cultures and will never decrease in their importance. The 
number  of  examples  for  morality,  moral  questions  and  moral  decision-making  in 
history, presence and future is enormous and concerns every aspect of life: Religion, 
politics, society, family life, so to speak the whole environment that surrounds a human 
being.
How many unreasonable, immoral wars on our planet have killed so many (innocent) 
people? The two World Wars for example, the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 – can these 
wars be morally justified? Or can any war be a “moral” war? The same with political 
rulers. How  many  leading  political  personalities  (not  only  in  history)  have  caused 
poverty and disastrous conditions in their countries only because of power, greediness, 
irresponsibility,  selfishness and callousness? But not only politicians lack sometimes 
moral behavior.
Each individual gets into moral conflicts – every day. For example, when I run to the 
bus station to catch the waiting bus home, I see an old lady who stumbled and needs 
help. How would I behave? Would I help the old lady to pick up her purchases? Even 
though I had a long working day and I would have to wait two more hours for my next 
bus home? And what,  if  the cashier  gave me too much change? What would I  do? 
Would I keep the money or would I give it back?
Every  moral  conflict  represents  a  weighing  of  personal  benefits  against  moral 
conscience.  Probably our society could not  survive if  the majority of  people would 
decide always in an immoral way that leads to a maximum of their personal benefits. 
But, in each society, individuals exist who show personality traits that dominate their 
moral conscience such as shallowness, lack of guilt and empathy, or a grandiose sense 
of  self-worth.  If  these  characteristics appear  in  combination  with  impulsivity, 
irresponsibility,  delinquency  and  poor  behavioral  controls  (among  others),  this 
individual is called a psychopath. Therefore, it was supposed that psychopaths could be 
impaired in moral reasoning and show pathological correlates for this behavior. For that 
reason, it would be interesting to know more about deficiencies in brain mechanisms 
and activations  in  psychopaths  that  could  help  to  understand other  neuropsychiatric 
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questions in relation with violent and social or moral behavior, emotion processing and 
morals and moral decision-making as well as their deficits.
So,  not  only morality but  also psychopathy are  both  subjects  about  which  many 
philosophers,  psychologists,  psychiatrists  and  other  scientists  wondered  and  still 
wonder. A lot of research has been initiated in these fields and literature offers a wide 
spectrum of ideas, theories and data. Especially in healthy subjects a lot of research has 
been done concerning moral  decision-making and its  neural  correlates.  However,  in 
most of these studies, abstract moral dilemmas have been used. As for psychopaths, the 
psychopathological correlates and mechanisms of psychopathy were subjects of interest 
in several studies. But, so far no study has investigated realistic and everyday moral 
conflicts in psychopathic individuals.  .
This is what the present fMRI study has attempted to achieve.  Therefore,  twelve 
psychopathic subjects were presented with verbal stories describing realistic everyday 
conflicts  with  either  moral  or  neutral  content.  Results  were  analysed  on  functional 
imaging  and  on  behavioral  level  and  compared  to  the  results  of  twelve  non-
psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects.  With  the  obtained  results,  the  present  study 
wants  to  contribute  to  further  understanding  of  the  pathological  mechanisms  in 
psychopaths in relation to their deficiency or differences in moral decision-making, in 
their behavior in everyday life as well as in their neural correlates. This may help to 
understand  psychiatric,  psychological  and  neurological  problems  in  the  fields  of 
antisocial behavior and emotional detachment as well as deficient emotion processing. 
In addition, this study could help to generalize findings of moral decision-making to 
everyday moral conflicts.    
The following theoretical part of this thesis will be separated into two main sections. 
First,  definition and theories of morality and moral reasoning, as well  as the neural 
correlates  of  moral  reasoning in  healthy individuals  are  going to  be  described.  The 
second  theoretical  part  describes  the  concept  of  psychopathy,  theories  on  its 
development and neural correlates of psychopathy. A description of the present study's 
aim concludes this part.
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2 THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND
2.1 Morality and Moral Reasoning 
2.1.1 Definition and Theories of Morality, Moral Reasoning and Moral 
Emotions
How  is  morality  defined?  And  what  is  moral?  These  very  general  but  important 
questions have been discussed by many scientists in the past, in the philosophical as 
well as in the psychological field, in the legal as well as in the ethical field, and are still  
subjects of interest. In this chapter, the different definitions and theories of morality and 
moral  reasoning  as  well  as  their  development  in  human  history,  are  going  to  be 
described.  For  this,  philosophical  views  are  going  to  be  included  as  well  as 
psychological and neuroscientific aspects.
A very general description of morality can be drawn from the literal meaning of the 
Latin word  moralitas  which is 'manner,  character,  proper behavior'.  This means that 
morality subsumes customs, norms and moral values within a social group  (Adolphs,
2003). So, morality is universal, but culturally variable. In general, a consensus about 
the valid moral norms of a social group is crucial for a possible coexistence of several 
individuals within a social group. To judge the adequacy of one's own or others' moral 
behaviors according to the socially and culturally shaped social agreements and values, 
the  mechanism  of  moral  reasoning,  that  includes  moral  judgment,  is  extremely 
important for the human being. By and by, the definition and understanding of morality, 
moral reasoning and moral emotions and their importance changed a lot.
Moral theories have a long history that begins with the Greek philosophers Plato 
(427-347  BC)  and  Aristotle  (384-322  BC)  who  represented  a  virtue-theoretic 
psychology that demanded the virtuous person to cultivate their virtues and to avoid 
vices.  Plato  suggested  the  model  of  the  divided  self  saying  that  reason  rules  over 
passions and soul. Thus, it depends on the person's reasoning how to reach a state of 
maximal moral behavior (Plato, 1888).  
Another  important  moral  theory is  the  one  by Immanuel  Kant (1724-1804)  who 
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focused on the maxim of an action. With his 'categorical imperative' Kant premised the 
ability to 'reason purely' and required that all human beings act only on the maxims of 
what they want to become a universal law, other maxims are morally impermissible 
(Casebeer, 2003).
The  psychiatrist  Sigmund  Freud  (1856-1939)  defined  moral  development  as  a 
product  of  aspects  of  the  super-ego  as  guilt-shame  avoidance.  He  emphasizes  the 
influence  of  emotional  and  non-rational  processes  in  the  development  of  moral 
judgments (Freud, 1923).
Another  important  contribution  to  the  definition  of  moral  development  was 
developed by the Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget (1896-1980) who studied the child's 
developing  understanding  of  fairness  and  rules.  Piaget's  theory  of  the  cognitive 
development includes four stages, each stage describing a general cognitive structure 
that predominates in the child's thinking. The first stage is called the sensimotor stage 
and lasts  from the child's birth to the age of two. This stage is  characterized by an 
extreme  egocentricity  of  the  child,  as  it  cannot  perceive  the  world  from  others' 
viewpoints. The child experiences the world through its own senses and movements. In 
the following preoperational stage, from ages two to seven, egocentricity weakens and 
disappears in  the subsequent  concrete  operational  stage,  from ages seven to  twelve, 
when children  start  with  logical  reasoning.  In  the  fourth  and last  stage,  the  formal 
operational stage, children older than twelve years develop abstract reasoning (Piaget, 
1965).
With the cognitive revolution of the 1950s and 1960s, the American psychologist 
Lawrence  Kohlberg (1937-1987)  described  a  six-stage  model  of  cognitive-
developmental levels in the child's moral reasoning based on the pioneering work of 
Piaget. In effect, he described how the child's theories of morality change when it grows 
up. Kohlberg demonstrated that morality can be studied as a system of transformations 
of underlying cognitive constructs. His best known dilemma is the Heinz dilemma. A 
man called Heinz must decide whether he should break into a druggist's shop to steal a 
drug that may save the life of his dying wife. Kohlberg's theory of the development of 
morality includes three levels and six stages. Level one is the level of pre-conventional 
morality. It is subdivided into the first stage of obedience and punishment orientation 
which is characterized by a childish behavior that attempts to avoid punishment and to 
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act  with  unquestioning  obedience,  and  the  second  stage  of  self-interest  orientation 
(individualism and  exchange)  characterized  by  the  relativeness  of  right  and  wrong 
which  implicates  individual  interests.  The  second  cognitive-developmental  level  of 
Kohlberg's  model  is  the  level  of  conventional  morality  assuming  that  the  attitude 
adopted by the child/teen would be shared by the entire social  community.  Thus, in 
stage three, children believe that good behavior is important and equivalent to what 
society requires, and implies the experience of interpersonal feelings such as empathy, 
trust and love. In stage four, subjects start to see society as a whole and try to maintain 
the social order by obeying laws and respecting authorities. In level three, morality is 
post-conventional and people start to take a prior-to-society perspective in stage five 
which emphasizes a social contract and individual rights orientation with the aim of 
determining how a society ought to be like. In stage six, the principles by which justice 
is  achieved are defined. These principles of justice include the respect for the basic 
dignity of all people (Kohlberg, 1969; Kohlberg et al., 1983). 
Thus,  moral  psychology  was  dominated  for  a  long  time  by  the  developmental 
theories of Piaget and Kohlberg who stressed the influence of reasoning in the moral 
judgment  process. But  recently,  a  new trend  emphasizing  the  role  of  intuitive  and 
emotional processes in human decision making and sociality came up. The American 
psychology professor  Jonathan  Haidt  (2001)  developed the  social  intuitionist  model 
which  is  an  alternative  to  rationalist  models  and  emphasizes  social  and  cultural 
influences.  Haidt  doubts  reasoning  models  because  of  four  reasons.  First,  the  dual 
process  problem:  whereas  reasoning  has  been  overemphasized  in  moral  judgment, 
intuition  has  been  under-studied.  Second,  reasoning  is  often  motivated.  Third,  the 
reasoning process constructs post hoc justifications of intuitive judgments. And fourth, 
moral action co-varies with moral emotion more than with moral reasoning. The social 
intuitionist model is not an antirationalist model but an alternative model that connects 
intuition, reasoning and social influences. The intuitionist part of the social intuitionist 
model proposes moral judgments as the result of fast, automatic and often affect-laden 
processes (intuitions) in which an evaluative feeling of good-bad or like-dislike appears 
in consciousness without  any conscious awareness of having gone through steps of 
searching,  weighing  evidence,  or  inferring  a  conclusion.  Haidt  describes  moral 
judgment as an interpersonal process. So, in his social intuitionist model, he claims that 
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in  an  eliciting  situation,  person  A's  intuition,  judgment  and  reasoning  are  well 
interconnected with and influenced by person B's reasoning, judgment and intuition, and 
vice versa. As morality is unique to a culture or group, Haidt proposes that although 
moral intuitions are innate, the development of intuitions in children depends on three 
processes  which  modify within  different  cultures:  the  selective  loss  of  intuitions  as 
cultures  specialize  in  a  subset  of  human  moral  potential;  the  immersion  in  custom 
complexes  which  implicates  social  learning  and  imitation  of  moral  intuitions  by 
children; and the peer socialization during the sensitive period of late childhood and 
adolescence. Thus, moral development is a matter of maturation and cultural shaping of 
endogenous intuitions  (Haidt,  2001).
So,  moral  judgment  is  driven  primarily  by  rapid,  affectively  based,  intuitive 
responses, with deliberate justifications in response to social demands. Haidt's social 
intuitionist model was picked up as a basis for further research in moral emotions and 
Haidt himself discussed the importance of moral emotions. He defined moral emotions 
as emotions “that are linked to the interest or welfare either of society as a whole or at  
least  of  persons  other  than  the  judge  or  agent”  (Haidt,  2003).  Prototypical  moral 
emotions  such  as  anger,  elevation,  guilt,  compassion,  are  easily  triggered  by  a 
disinterested elicitor that does not directly affect the individual. Haidt uses the image of 
homo economicus, a perfectly selfish creature that was already described by John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873) in oder to create a being that cares only about its own well-being. 
Haidt alludes to the comparison of the homo economicus with a psychopathic individual 
and  because  of  this,  he  describes  moral  emotions  as  “the  difference  between  the 
emotional life of homo sapiens and the emotional life of homo economicus or of a 
psychopath”  (Haidt,  2003). For example,  one of the prototypical emotions,  guilt,  an 
emotion that motivates people to treat their relationship partners well (Baumeister et al.,
1994) and that is triggered by the appraisal that one has caused harm, loss or distress to 
a relationship partner, is, if it is lacking, one of the defining factors of psychopathy (see 
table 1; Hare et al., 1991).
Recently, Greene et al. (2004) suggested a synthesis of both perspectives: emotion 
and reasoning. They distinguish “personal” moral judgments from “impersonal” moral 
judgments which means that “personal” moral judgments are “driven largely by social-
emotional  responses  while  other  “impersonal”  moral  judgments  are  driven  less  by 
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social-emotional  responses  and  more  by  “cognitive”  processes”  “while  the  term 
“cognitive”  is  referring  here  to  a  class  of  processes  that  contrast  with  affective  or 
emotional processes”(Greene et al., 2004).
Thomson (1985) invented two moral dilemmas to give an example for each personal 
and impersonal moral judgment  (Thomson, 1985): the trolley dilemma is an example 
for an impersonal moral dilemma: A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will 
be killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a  
switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one 
person instead of five. Should you turn the trolley in order to save five people at the 
expense of one? Greene et al. (2001) found out that most people say yes. The problem 
of  moral  dilemmas  is  that  they  are  choices  for  which  all  outcomes  are  morally 
undesirable.  A similar  problem is  the  footbridge  dilemma  that  represents  a  moral-
personal judgment: again, a trolley threatens to kill five people. The only way to save 
them is to push a stranger off the bridge so that he will die instead of the five people.  
Ought you to push the stranger to his death in oder to save the five others? In this case, 
most  people  say  no.  The  two  different  forms  of  dilemmas  show  that  some  moral 
dilemmas  engage  emotional  processing  more  than  others  and  these  differences  in 
emotional engagement affect people's judgments (Cushman et al., 2006; Greene et al., 
2001).  
Therefore,  moral  judgment  is  defined  as  an  evaluative  judgment  of  the  actions, 
behaviors, their adequacy and the character of a person, that is influenced by socially 
shaped ideas of right and wrong behavior and that applies to every member within a 
social group (Haidt, 2001; Moll et al., 2005). In conclusion, people who fail to embody 
these ideas  and present  with inadequate and wrong behavior,  are  socially criticized, 
ostracized or even punished (Ross, 1030; Shweder & Haidt, 1993). 
Summing up the different theories of morality, moral reasoning and moral emotions, 
it can be said that moral theories were dominated for a long time by the influence of 
reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1965). But a recent new trend emphasizes the role of 
intuitive and emotional processes in human decision-making processes and leads to a 
theory of synthesis of emotion and reasoning in moral processes (Greene et al., 2004; 
Haidt, 2001). Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that moral development is an 
individual process that happens in several stages and levels in a child and leads, if it was 
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successful,  to  an  intact  moral  judgment  and  behavior  that  is  crucial  for  social 
interacting.
By the  development  of  new technologies  such  as  functional  magnetic  resonance 
tomography,  the above mentioned and described theories on morality as well  as the 
influence of emotion and reasoning processes, can be investigated and underpinned by 
neural  correlates  of  certain brain areas.  In  the  following part,  several  neuroimaging 
studies  that  investigated  moral  reasoning  in  healthy  individuals  and  contributed  to 
further  understanding of  brain  activation  mechanisms in  human being during  moral 
decision-making are going to be described.
2.1.2 Neural Correlates of Moral Reasoning in Healthy Individuals
As moral reasoning is an area of intense interest in the recent and current neuroimaging 
research, there have been several studies that addressed the neural correlates of moral 
emotions and moral judgments in healthy individuals. Functional imaging studies have 
involved different paradigms such as simple moral  judgments,  moral  dilemmas, and 
moral  emotions,  using  different  tasks  and  stimulus  presentation  schemes.  The  most 
important results and neural correlates are summarized in this chapter. 
First, typical activations of frontal lobe areas such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
and the medial frontal gyrus are going to be described. Then, study results that show the 
neural correlates of moral decision-making in the parietal lobe such as the precuneus 
and the posterior cingulate gyrus are going to be described. Further, studies that found 
activated brain areas in the temporal lobe such as the superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
and the temporal poles are going to be described. In addition, other associated brain 
areas that activated in several studies on moral decision-making such as the cerebellar 
cortex and the amygdala are going to be summarized. 
Frontal Lobe. A brain area of great interest regarding moral decision-making in healthy 
individuals is the frontal lobe and within it especially the medial frontal gyrus and the 
orbitofrontal  gyrus.  Several  neuroimaging  studies  revealed  activation  in  these  areas 
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when investigating judgments about simple moral claims  (Moll et al., 2001), pictures 
with moral content (Moll et al., 2002a) or moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001).
In an fMRI study, Moll et al. (2001) presented subjects with simple claims, some 
with moral content  (“The boy stole his mother's savings”) and others without moral 
content (“Every text has words”). Judgments in response to claims with moral content 
produced increased activity bilaterally in the  frontal pole (BA 10) and in the  medial 
frontal gyrus bilaterally (BA 9/10; Moll et al., 2001). The results of another fMRI study 
by Moll et al. (2002a) where pictures with emotionally charged scenes with or without 
moral content and pictures with emotionally neutral content were presented in a passive 
visual  task  to  healthy  subjects,  showed  an  increased  activation  of  the  right  medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the medial frontal gyrus elicited by moral in comparison 
with nonmoral unpleasant stimuli. By analyzing the different effects of faces and moral 
stimuli on brain activation, they also showed that the medial OFC and the medial frontal 
gyrus were centrally involved in processing pictures with high moral content  (Moll et
al., 2002a). Heekeren et al. (2003; 2005) investigated brain areas that showed activation 
when subjects judged sentences decribing behaviors as moral or immoral. They, too, 
confirmed the importance of the medial OFC (Heekeren et al., 2003 Heekeren et al., 
2005). In a third fMRI study by Moll and colleagues (2002), subjects were presented 
with short statements with either nonmoral neutral (“Fat children should make a diet”), 
nonmoral unpleasant (“Pregnant women often throw up”), moral (“Criminals should go 
to  jail”)  or  scrambled  content  (“Kick  like  poor  rain  old  have”).  Compared  to  the 
nonmoral unpleasant condition, the moral condition induced increased activation in the 
medial OFC (BA 10/11), whereas for the nonmoral social judgments the left lateral OFC 
(BA  11/47)  showed  increased  activitation.  These  results  suggest  a  functional 
dissociation between neural networks within the OFC itself (Moll et al., 2002b). 
An fMRI study that used moral dilemmas such as the footbridge dilemma (for a 
moral-personal dilemma) or the trolley dilemma (for a moral-impersonal dilemma) in 
order  to  investigate  emotional  engagement  in  moral  judgment,  was  performed  by 
Greene and colleagues (2001). They showed that subjects had increased activation for 
moral-personal  dilemmas  in  the  medial  prefrontal  cortex   (BA 9/10)  compared   to 
moral-impersonal dilemmas and non-moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001).  
The role of  medial frontal gyrus is furthermore emphasized by Greene and Haidt 
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(2002). They describe the medial frontal gyrus as a brain area located around the border 
of Brodmann areas (BA) 9 and 10 which is supposed to integrate emotion into decision-
making and planning and which also seems to be involved in theory of mind (ToM, the 
capacity to represent other's mental states) (Greene & Haidt, 2002). This region should 
be distinguished from the OFC (BA 10/11) which might play a role in simple moral  
judgments and moral tasks  (Moll et al., 2002). Moll et al. (2002) split up the OFC as 
they  found  out  that  moral  judgments  associated  with  unpleasant  emotions  induced 
activation in the anterior aspect of the medial OFC, whereas nonmoral social judgments 
associated  with  unpleasant  emotions  induced lateral  activation  (Moll  et  al.,  2002b).
In conclusion, the areas involved in moral decision-making that are located in the 
frontal  lobe,  are  the  medial  and  superior  frontal  gyrus  (BA 9/10)  as  well  as  the 
orbitofrontal gyrus (BA 10/11). Besides their involvement in moral processes, some of 
their  further  functions  are  related  to  theory  of  mind,  viewing  emotional  pictures, 
integrating emotion into decision-making and reactive aggression (Blair, 2001; Damasio 
et al., 1994; Gallagher et al., 2000).
Parietal  Lobe.  Besides  the  above  mentioned  areas  of  the  frontal  lobe,  brain  areas 
located in the parietal lobe such as the posterior cingulate gyrus and the precuneus have 
been  investigated  in  several  moral  decision-making  tasks.  The  investigators  of  the 
different studies used paradigms such as moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001), simple 
moral judgments  (Moll et al., 2001), pictures with emotionally charged moral content 
(Moll et al.,  2002a) and empathic and forgivability judgments  (Farrow et al.,  2001).
When  investigating  emotional  engagement  in  moral  judgment  in  an  fMRI 
experiment, Greene and colleagues (2001) revealed a significantly higher activation of 
the  posterior  cingulate  gyrus (BA 31)  in  moral-personal  conditions  (judging  moral-
personal  dilemmas  such  as  a  version  of  the  footbridge  dilemma)  than  in  moral-
impersonal  (judging  moral-impersonal  dilemmas  such  as  a  version  of  the  trolley 
dilemma)  and non-moral  conditions  (Greene  et  al.,  2001).  Furthermore,  Moll  et  al. 
(2001) showed left precuneus activation (BA 7) in moral judgments (“The boy stole his 
mother's savings”) compared to factual judgments (“Every text has words”) in an fMRI 
study. In another fMRI study by Moll et al. (2002a), they investigated brain activation in 
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a passive visual task when subjects were presented with pictures with scenes of moral or 
neutral content. Right precuneus activation (BA 7) was shown in the moral emotion 
condition (Moll et al., 2002a). In addition, Farrow et al. (2001) investigated the neural 
correlates  of  empathy  and  forgiveness  in  an  fMRI  study  and  revealed  increased 
precuneus  activation  (BA 7)  in  empathic  and  forgivability  judgments  as  well  as 
significant activation in the posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 31) in empathy judgments 
compared to social reasoning judgments (Farrow et al., 2001). 
Summing up the findings of parietal lobe brain activation in previous studies, the 
posterior  cingulate  cortex  region and the  precuneus  around BA 31/7,  areas  that  are 
known  to  be  important  for  emotional  and  memory-related  processes,  seem  to  be 
crucially involved in moral decision-making (Maddock et al., 2003). 
Temporal Lobe. Additional to frontal and parietal lobe involvement in moral decision-
making, several areas of the temporal lobe play a crucial role in moral decision-making. 
Especially the superior temporal sulcus (STS, BA 39) and the temporal poles (BA 38) 
were revealed in studies that investigated judgments about moral claims  (Moll et al.,
2002b), moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001) and moral pictures (Moll et al., 2002a).
Moll et al. (2002) for example, found an activation of a network comprising the STS 
and the temporal pole of the left hemisphere when subjects were presented with moral 
judgments (Moll et al., 2002b). Greene and colleagues (2001) supported these findings 
and showed increased activation bilaterally in the angular gyrus (BA 39) while subjects 
responded to personal moral dilemmas relative to impersonal moral dilemmas and non-
moral dilemmas  (Greene et al., 2001). In another fMRI study by Moll and colleagues 
(2001),  increased  activation  in  the  right  temporal  pole  (BA 21/22/38)  and the  right 
posterior temporal sulcus (BA 39) was shown when subjects were presented with moral 
judgments  compared to  factual  judgments  (Moll  et  al.,  2001).  Investigating subjects 
during viewing pictures with moral content, Moll et al. (2002) also found an increased 
activation in the right posterior STS (BA 21/39; Moll et al., 2002a).  
Together with parts of the angular gyrus and the supramarginal gyrus, the STS region 
is a part of the so-called temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), an area at the border of the 
temporal and the parietal cortices. This area is located mostly in Brodmann Areas 39, 40 
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and 41. Concerning the function of the STS /  TPJ region, it  is  supposed to play an 
important role in theory of mind (ToM) and therefore is necessary for the ability to 
make inferences about the beliefs and intention of others (Allison et al., 2000; Sommer 
et al., 2007).  But the STS / TPJ region is not only associated with ToM but also with 
social  perception,  facial  emotion  recognition,  and  the  representation  of  intentional 
actions as well as imitation, imitation learning and action understanding (Allision et al., 
2000; Narumoto et al., 2001; Rizzalotti & Craighero, 2004; Saxe et al., 2004). Beyond, 
this region plays an important role in forgiveness and empathy processing (Carr et al., 
2003; Farrow et al., 2001; Leslie et al., 2004).
In sum, there are brain regions located in the temporal lobe that are involved in moral 
decision-making processes. Besides the temporal pole, it is especially the STS region 
which plays an important role in moral reasoning. The STS regions corresponds in part 
to the TPJ which is known to be involved in ToM, social perception, forgiveness and 
empathy processing.
Other Brain Areas. Besides the above mentioned brain areas of the frontal, parietal and 
temporal lobe that are involved in moral processing, there are other brain areas that 
were investigated in previous studies on moral judgments  (Moll et al., 2001) and on 
moral pictures  (Moll et al., 2002a). These other brain areas include the amygdala and 
the cerebellar cortex. Increased  activity  in  the  right  cerebellar  cortex  was  shown by 
Moll and colleagues (2001) in an fMRI study when moral judgments were compared to 
factual judgments (Moll et al., 2001). 
An  area  that  showed  increased  activation  in  moral  tasks  is  the  amygdala.  For 
example, Moll et al. (2002a) presented subjects with pictures with moral contents and 
pictures with neutral contents, and found greater activity in the amygdala during the 
presentation  of  moral  pictures  compared  to  neutral  pictures  (Moll  et  al.,  2002a). 
Heekeren et al. (2005) support the finding of amygdala involvement in moral judgment 
(Heekeren  et  al.,  2005).  Furthermore,  studies  using  facial  expressions  as  stimuli 
revealed that the human amygdala is  involved in the processing of fear and related 
emotions (Adolphs et al., 1994; Morris et al., 1996).
To conclude, the growing interest in the neural correlates of moral reasoning has lead 
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to several neuroimaging studies that investigated judgments about simple moral claims, 
moral dilemmas or moral emotions. The findings of these studies can be summarized as 
an  involvement  of  brain  areas  that  are  located  in  the  frontal,  parietal  and temporal 
cortices  as  well  as  limbic  structures.  Specific  brain  areas  that  are  associated  with 
increased  activity  in  studies  with  moral  decisions  are  the  medial  frontal  gyrus,  the 
orbitofrontal gyrus, the precuneus and the posterior cingulate cortex, the STS (TPJ) and 
the  temporal  poles,  and the  amygdala.  Summarizing  all  these  findings,  Greene  and 
Haidt (2002) contributed to the definition and the development of “the moral brain” (see 
figure  1)  that  includes  all  brain  areas  associated  with  moral  reasoning.  But,  they 
emphasized that there is no specifically moral part of the brain, as every brain region of 
the above mentioned has also been implicated in other and non-moral processes (Greene
& Haidt,  2002).  Figure 1 illustrates  “the moral  brain” reproduced from Greene and 
Haidt (2002) and shows brain areas that are associated with moral reasoning.
Figure 1. Brain areas associated with moral reasoning, reproduced from Greene and Haidt (2002). 
Greene and Haidt summarized the brain areas that activated in several moral decision-making studies 
(Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b). The activated brain areas are numbered and 
consist  of:  1  medial  frontal  gyrus;  2  posterior  cingulate,  precuneus,  retrosplenial  cortex;  3  superior 
temporal  sulcus,  inferior parietal lobe;  4 orbitofrontal/ventromedial  frontal  cortex;  5 temporal pole;  6 
amygdala; 7 dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; 8 parietal lobe.
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2.2 The Concept of Psychopathy 
This introductory part gives an insight into the concept of psychopathy. First, historical 
views and the historical development of the concept of psychopathy are going to be 
described. Then, Hare's clinical construct of psychopathy as well as the Psychopathy 
Checklist - Revised  will be explained (Hare, 1980; Hare et al., 1991). Following this, 
some theories of the development of psychopathy are going to be described. And finally, 
several neuroscientific studies that investigated the neural correlates of psychopathy will 
be delineated.
2.2.1 Historical Views on the Concept of Psychopathy
200 years ago, in 1809, the French psychiatrist Philippe Pinel was one of the first in the 
scientific  literature to  describe a  mental  disorder  with  emotional  involvement.  Pinel 
used  the  term “manie  sans  délire”  to  describe  a  state  of  rage  without  any signs  of 
delirium  (Pinel, 1801). Whereas these individuals did not have deficits in intellectual 
functions, their behavior was characterized by a lack of morality (Weber et al., 2008). 
Jean-Étienne Esquirol, one of his students, extended this concept to his own theory of 
“monomania”.  This  concept  defined  a  partial  disturbance  of  mental  functions  and 
involved for example intellectual,  emotional, or volitional moral functions (Esquirol, 
1838; Herpertz & Sass, 2000). 
In the Anglo-American area there were psychiatrists like James Cowles Prichard who 
coined the term “moral insanity” (1835) defining a “madness consisting in a morbid 
perversion  of  the  natural  feelings,  affections,  inclinations,  temper  habits,  moral 
dispositions, and natural impulses”  (Prichard, 1835). Thus, moral insanity was for the 
first time a hypothetical cause of social deviance (Blackburn, 1988). 
The  Italian  psychiatrist  Cesare  Lombroso popularized  the  concept  of  the 
“delinquente nato” (born criminal) in 1876, believing that criminal individuals can be 
identified by “deformations of their skulls”. Thus, the idea of the “criminal mind” was 
born (Lombroso, 1876). 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the German psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin (1904) 
constructed a classification of psychopathic personalities  (Blackburn, 1988). The most 
influential of several similar typologies that followed, was the one by Kurt Schneider, a 
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German psychiatrist who divided abnormal personalities into “those who suffer from 
their  psychic abnormality,  and those from whom society suffers”  (Herpertz  & Sass,
2000). He described these abnormal personalities as a heterogeneous group and divided 
this group into ten specific types of classes mainly by terms of trait (Blackburn, 1988). 
This  definition  of  abnormal  personalities  led  to  the  basics  of  today's  concept  of 
personality disorders that are categorized in the modern classification systems DSM-IV 
and ICD-10 (Herpertz & Sass, 2000). 
It was in 1941 when the American psychiatrist Hervey Cleckley published his book 
The Mask of Sanity and described the psychopathic individual as a person that could be 
socially  well  adjusted  and  successful  but  that  is  characterized  by  deviant  and 
irresponsible  behavior  (Cleckley,  1941).  His  pioneering  theory  was  picked  up  and 
operationalized by the Canadian criminal psychologist Robert D. Hare who defined and 
developed the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) (see table 1) (Hare et al., 1991).
So, in  the past  200 years,  the concept  of psychopathy developed from a general 
mental  disorder  with  emotional  involvement,  a  lack  of  moral  behaviors  but  intact 
intellectual functions to an irresponsible and socially deviant but successful personality 
that represents the basis of the current understanding and definition of psychopathy.
2.2.2 Definition and Concepts of Psychopathy and Antisocial 
Personality 
At the  moment,  there  are  three  different  diagnostic  categories  in  use  to  diagnose  a 
socially harmful antisocial  personality:  the DSM-IV criteria  of antisocial  personality 
disorder  (APD),  the  ICD-10  criteria  of  dissocial  personality  disorder  and  Hare's 
psychopathic personality disorder.  
The diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder in the DSM-IV is based on antisocial 
behavioral qualities. These antisocial criterion are easy to investigate, like for example 
repetitive delinquency or  aggressive  behavior,  but  they do not  implicate  personality 
traits, such as egocentricity, lack of remorse, callousness and so forth. 
Another diagnostic criterion is the ICD-10 criterion of dissocial personality disorder 
that extends the criteria of a personality disorder to affective personality traits, such as 
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lack of remorse and callousness (Habermeyer & Herpertz, 2006).
An alternative  to  antisocial  and dissocial  personality  disorder  is  the  diagnosis  of 
psychopathy measured and defined by Hare's Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (PCL-R) 
(Hare et al., 1991) that was also used in the present study. The original Psychopathy 
Checklist (PCL) based on Cleckley's work and consisted of a 22-item clinical rating 
scale designed to assess the traditional clinical construct of psychopathy (Hare, 1980). 
The PCL-R now consists of 20 items measuring behaviors and inferred personality traits 
that are considered to be fundamental for the clinical construct of psychopathy (Hare et 
al., 1991; see table 1). Each of the 20 items is scored on a three-point scale according to  
specific criteria through institutional file information and a standardized semistructured 
interview by a professional.  Each item can be scored with 0 to 2 points, whereas 0 
indicates that it definitely does not apply, 1 that it applies somewhat or only in a limited 
sense, and 2 that it definitely does apply to the person (Hare et al., 1991) resulting that 
“total scores can range from 0 to 40 and represent the extent to which a person matches 
the prototypical psychopath”  (Hare et  al.,  1991).  Furthermore,  each of the 20 items 
belongs to one of two stable factors (see table 1). Affective-interpersonal characteristics, 
such as glibness, lack of remorse, callousness, and so forth are summarized by 8 items 
in factor 1, whereas factor 2 includes 9 items describing an antisocial and social deviant 
personality (Hare et al., 1991). The result is a maximum score on factor 1 of 16 points 
and on factor 2 of 18 points. Three items (promiscuous sexual behavior, many short-
term marital relationships and criminal versatility) are not subordinated to none of the 
two factors.
A new three-factor model was presented by Cooke and Michie (2001) which omitted 
items that described directly criminal activities, and factor 1 was divided into deceitful 
interactive style (new factor 1) and affective hypo-responsiveness (new factor 2), while 
factor 2 approximately corresponds to the new factor 3 (Cooke & Michie, 2001). Hare 
himself,  developed  a  four-factor  model  that  includes  the  interpersonal  factor  1,  the 
affective factor 2, the lifestyle factor 3 and the antisocial factor 4 (Hare, 2003; see table 
1).
It is important to note that the term “psychopathy” is not synonymous with the DSM-
IV concept  of  the  APD but  that  psychopaths  form a  special  subgroup of  the  APD 
(Herpertz & Sass, 2000). Compared to Hare's concept of psychopathy that implicates a 
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high score on both factor 1 and factor 2, persons with APD are mostly restricted to score 
high on factor 2. So, the diagnosis of APD concentrates mostly on antisocial behavior 
(Blair,  2003;  Hare  et  al.,  1991;  Weber  et  al.,  2008).  That  is  the  reason  why  the 
prevalence of APD is very high especially in prison inmates: Schönfeld et al. (2006) 
reported prevalence rates of APD of nearly one-third in both incarcerated female and 
male subjects whereas Hart and Hare (1996) found that only one-third of those who 
were diagnosed with APD met criteria for psychopathy (Hart & Hare, 1996; Schönfeld 
et  al.,  2006).  Altogether,  psychopathy is  believed to affect approximately 1% of the 
general population and approximately 15-25% of incarcerated offenders  (Hare et al.,
1991).
Besides providing some epidemiological data,  the PCL-R score is correlated with 
other criminal qualities and provides predictive criterion-related evidence, for example 
for recidivism rates for violent offenses or substance misuse. In a follow up study, Rice 
et al. (1990) revealed that in 54 rapists, the PCL-R score was positively correlated with 
a recidivism rate for violent offenses in general and for sexual offenses in particular 
(Rice et  al.,  1990).  Furthermore,  Hart  and Hare (1989) found a positive correlation 
between substance misuse and PCL-R total scores (Hare et al., 1991).  
Concluding, psychopathy is the theoretical construct of a disorder, defined by Hare's 
Psychopathy  Checklist-Revised  (PCL-R)  and  characterized  in  part  by  emotional 
detachment and poor behavioral controls  (Hare et al.,  1991). In comparison to APD, 
psychopathy is not only defined by antisocial behavior (factor 2), but also by the lack of 
emotional impairment (factor 1) such as the lack of guilt (Blair, 2003). So, the definition 
of psychopathy is more than the literal meaning of the simple word (Greek  η ψυχη – 
soul and τα παθη – disease) that describes no more than a mental illness. Rather, it is a 
complex personality disorder with antisocial and deficient affective personality traits.
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Table 1. The 20 items of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) classified into the two-factor 
model and the four-factor model (Hare et al., 1991; Hare, 2003). Two-factor model:  developed by 
Hare (1991). Each of the 20 items belongs to one of two stable factors. Whereas factor 1 subsumes eight  
affective-interpersonal  characteristics,  factor  2 includes nine items describing an antisocial  and social 
deviant personality. Three items are not subordinated to none of the factors. Each of the items is scored on 
a three-point scale and the total score can range from 0 to 40 and represents the extent to which a person 
matches  the  prototypical  psychopath.  Four-factor model:  also  developed  by Hare  (2003).  The  four 
factors consist of the interpersonal factor 1, the affective factor 2, the lifestyle factor 3 and the antisocial 
factor 4. Two items (promiscuous sexual behavior and many marital relationships) do not load on any 
factor.
Item Two-factor model Four-factor model 
1 Glibness/superficial charm 1 1
2 Grandiose sense of self-worth 1 1
3 Need for stimulation 2 3
4 Pathological lying 1 1
5 Conning/manipulative 1 1
6 Lack of remorse or guilt 1 2
7 Shallow affect 1 2
8 Callous/lack of empathy 1 2
9 Parasitic lifestyle 2 3
10 Poor behavioral controls 2 4
11 Promiscuous sexual behavior - -
12 Early behavioral problems 2 4
13 Lack of realistic, long-term goals 2 3
14 Impulsivity 2 3
15 Irresponsibility 2 3
16 Failure to accept responsibility 1 2
17 Many marital relationships - -
18 Juvenile delinquency 2 4
19 Revocation of conditional release 2 4
20 Criminal versatility - 4
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2.2.3 Theories of the Development of Psychopathy and Psychopathic 
Tendencies
In general, personality disorders have a multi-causal genesis ranging from genetic and 
neural defects to disorders in psychoanalytical aspects, and from childhood trauma to 
social  influences  and  situational  conditions.  The  same  seems  to  apply  for  the 
pathogenesis of psychopathy. Neurobiological, psychological and social factors seem be 
interconnected  factors  that  contribute  to  the  development  of  the  psychopathic 
personality  disorder  (Paris,  1993).  The  following  part  gives  an  insight  into  some 
important etiological factors such as genetic and neurocognitive factors that play a role 
in the pathogenesis of psychopathy.  
Concerning  the  genetic  factors,  studies  revealed  an  association  between 
monoaminoxiase  A  (MAO-A)  genetic  polymorphism,  neglect  in  childhood  and 
antisocial  behavior  of children.  They showed that  neglected children with a  genetic 
variant on X-chromosome followed by a reduced activity of MAO-A had a much more 
higher  risk  to  develop  an  antisocial  personality  disorder  (Goodman  et  al.,  1997). 
Another study has investigated the genetic risk for psychopathy. Viding et al. (2005) 
examined twins regarding callous-unemotional traits (CU) and high levels of antisocial 
behavior (AB) at the age of seven. The results indicated that high levels of CU is under 
strong genetic  influence as  well  as  AB for  children  who are  high  on CU is  highly 
heritable  (Viding  et  al.,  2005).  So,  genetic  changes  seem  to  play  a  role  in  the 
pathogenesis of psychopathy. But  it  has  to  be  considered  that  neurobiological  and 
genetic research is a wide field where more research is necessary for a better assessment 
of its importance and its involvement in personality disorders such as psychopathy.
Besides  genetic  influences,  theoretical  neurocognitive  models  try  to  give  an 
explanation for the development of psychopathy. Actually, there are different current 
theoretical models: i) the response modulation hypothesis by Newman, ii) the Violence 
Inhibition Mechanism by Blair, iii) the somatic marker hypothesis by Damasio and, iv) 
the social response reversal hypothesis by Blair. In the following part, the basic ideas of 
these four theories are going to be summarized.
The response modulation hypothesis by Newman defines response modulation as a 
process that involves a rapid and relatively automatic shift of attention from a dominant 
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response that is expected to be rewarded to the evaluation of response consequences 
(Newman, 1998; Newman et al., 1997; Patterson & Newman, 1993). This shift allows 
individuals to adjust their responses, if needed, by suppressing the dominant response 
instead  of  intensifying  the  dominant  response  which  will  lead  to  non-rewarded 
consequences. This is where psychopaths are supposed to have deficits. They persist 
more  likely  in  the  dominant  and  originally  rewarded  response,  even  if  they  know 
previously  that  this  response  will  later  be  punished  (Fisher  et  al.,  1998).  The 
consequences of this shift  deficit may be impulsive and antisocial behavior. So, this 
model indicates an impairment of automatic processing mechanisms in psychopaths that 
may explain in part why psychopaths tend to antisocial and violent behavior and why 
they lack premeditation or perseverance. But it has to be considered, that this model is a 
very general  approach to  the  development  of  psychopathy and does  not  explain  all 
characteristic features of psychopaths.
As mentioned above, there is another important neurocognitive theoretical model that 
should be considered when trying to explain the development of psychopathy. It was 
Blair (1995) who proposed the Violence Inhibition Mechanism (VIM; Blair, 1995), a 
model that is based on animal observation findings of the ethologists Eibl-Eibesfeldt 
(1970)  and  Lorenz  (1981).  As  they  noted  that  some  social  animal  species  display 
submission cues to  a  conspecific aggressor which resulted in  the termination of the 
attack, the ethologists suggested that in these animal species certain aggression-control-
mechanisms might exist (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970; Lorenz, 1966). So, Blair considered the 
VIM to be a functionally similar cognitive mechanism in human beings that leads to a 
withdrawal reaction of the observer when the observed human being displays distress 
cues (e.g. sad facial affects). Blair (1995) suggests that the VIM is a prerequisite that is 
importantly  involved  in  normal  moral  development  implicating  the  development  of 
moral  emotions,  the  inhibition  of  violence  and  the  moral/conventional  distinction. 
Therefore, individuals with a lack of VIM tend to violent and immoral behavior and to 
impaired  experiencing  of  moral  emotions.  And  vice  versa,  Blair  proposes  that 
psychopaths, who are characterized by their violent behavior and their lack of moral 
emotions  such  as  empathy,  have  a  deficient  VIM  (Blair,  1995).  In  addition,  Blair 
confirmed  that  psychopaths  fail  to  distinguish  between  moral  and  conventional 
transgressions in their judgments and  that total PCL scores correlated with the tendency 
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to  judge  conventional  transgressions  as  moral  (Blair,  1995).  So,  the  VIM  is  an 
alternative theoretical model that explains parts of the psychopathological mechanisms 
in psychopaths, especially their violent and antisocial behavior and their lack of moral 
emotions.
A third theoretical alternative that is used to explain deficits in aggression control in 
psychopaths, is the somatic marker hypothesis by Damasio (1994). The key idea of this 
hypothesis is that decision-making is a process that is influenced by marker signals that 
arise in bioregulatory processes (Damasio, 1994b). Damasio described the ventromedial 
PFC  (orbitofrontal  and  medial  frontal  cortex)  as  a  “repository”  that  links  factual 
knowledge and bioregulatory states.  He suggested that  a disturbance of the somatic 
marker system leads to an insensitivity for potential negative consequences and results 
in antisocial and immoral behavior (Damasio, 1994b). 
Finally, another theoretical model was proposed by Blair (2001). The social response 
reversal model (SRR) stresses the influence of social cues in the modulation of social 
behavior. The SRR seems to be activated by angry expressions or the expectation of 
another's  anger.  This  activation  results  in  a  modulation  of  reactive  aggression  and 
behavioral responding mediated by the hypothalamus and the periaqueductal grey, and 
leads to a shift of responding  (Blair, 2001). It was shown that response reversal was 
impaired  in  individuals  with  psychopathy  (Budhani  &  Blair,  2005;  Budhani  et  al., 
2006). 
In sum, several hypotheses and theoretical models exist that may explain, at least in 
part,  the  deficient  moral  development  of  psychopaths  as  well  as  their  antisocial 
behavior. But, the pathogenesis of psychopathy cannot be explained by these theoretical 
models alone. This is, first, due to the fact that other factors have to be considered, such 
as  genetic,  psychosocial  and  neurobiological  factors.  And  second,  because  the 
interaction and interconnection of all  these factors is  poorly understood.  So,  further 
research  is  necessary  to  find  out  all  aspects  that  contribute  to  the  development  of 
psychopathy.
An aspect that is studied already relatively well concerns the neural correlates of 
psychopathy. This topic will be described in the subsequent part.
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2.2.4 Neural Correlates of Psychopathy 
It  was  an  accident  report  that  aroused  growing  interest  in  the  neural  correlates  of 
psychopathy.  In  1848,  the  railway foreman  Phineas  Gage  experienced  severe  brain 
injury  when  an  iron  rod  passed  through  his  skull  and  damaged  his  prefrontal  and 
especially  his  orbitofrontal  cortex.  After  this  incident,  Gage's  personality  changed 
profoundly and his behavior was characterized by antisocial and aggressive behavior 
patterns. This pseudopsychopathic behavior was called “acquired sociopathy”. Based on 
the  exhibited  pseudopsychopathic  behavior  of  frontal  lobe  patients  such as  Phineas 
Gage,  it  was  thought  that  prefrontal  brain regions  were crucially involved in  social 
behavior and therefore, dysfunctions of the frontal lobe might play a major role in the 
psychopathic personality (Anderson et al., 1999; Damasio, 1994). Besides the prefrontal 
and orbitofrontal cortex, other brain areas that seem to play a role in psychopathy are 
temporo-limbic  areas  such  as  the  anterior  cingulate,  the  posterior  cingulate,  the 
amygdala and the superior temporal sulcus.
Below, different studies that revealed structural as well as functional abnormalities in 
psychopaths  are  going  to  be  described.  First,  structural  brain  abnormalities  in 
psychopaths are going to be summarized. Then, studies that used new technologies such 
as  functional  magnetic  resonance  tomography  in  psychopaths  and  found  functional 
abnormalities are going to be pointed out.
2.4.4.1 Structural Brain Abnormalities in Psychopaths
Concerning  structural  abnormalities  in  psychopaths,  prefrontal  impairments  are, 
perhaps, the best-replicated finding in the imaging literature. It is important to indicate 
that not all studies investigated psychopaths, but many studies investigated individuals 
with antisocial personality disorder (APD). For example,  Raine et al.  (2000) studied 
structural brain abnormalities in a volumetric MRI study on individuals with APD and 
psychopathic-like  behavior,  on  male  individuals  with  substance  dependency,  on 
psychiatric male controls and on healthy male subjects. They found a significant volume 
reduction  of  11  % in  the  prefrontal  gray matter  volume in  subjects  with  APD and 
psychopathic-like behavior compared to the healthy male control group. Furthermore, 
the APD group showed a reduction of 14 % in prefrontal gray matter compared with the 
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psychiatric  control  group and a  reduction  of  13.9  % compared with  the  substance-
dependent group  (Raine et al., 2000). Specifying these findings, Yang and colleagues 
(2005)  distinguished  between  successful  (psychopathic  individuals  who  were  not 
detected  for  their  crimes)  and  unsuccessful  psychopaths  (who  were  detected  and 
convicted for their crimes) and found that only unsuccessful psychopathic individuals 
had a reduced prefrontal cortex volume of 22.3 % compared with control subjects (Yang
et al., 2005a). Furthermore,  Yang  and  colleagues  (2005b)  found  a  reduction  in  the 
prefrontal  gray/white  matter  ratio  and  an  increase  of  prefrontal  white  matter  in 
association with pathological lying  (Yang et al.,  2005b), which is one of the PCL-R 
items.  
However, none of these studies could show a more specific region within the gray 
matter of the frontal cortex. Hence, Blair (2003) points out that it is not a generalized 
frontal cortex dysfunction in psychopathic individuals, but that there must be specified 
regions  within  the  frontal  cortex  that  might  be  impaired  in  their  functions,  e.g.  the 
orbitofrontal cortex  (Blair,  2003). Differentiating the frontal cortex regions, Oliveira-
Souza et al. (2008) investigated psychiatric patients with high PCL scores in comparison 
to  healthy  control  subjects  in  a  voxel-based  morphometry  study and  revealed  gray 
matter reductions in frontopolar, medial and lateral orbitofrontal cortices. In addition to 
these  frontal  lobe  abnormalities  in  psychopathic  individuals,  Oliveira-Souza  and 
colleagues (2008) found gray matter reductions in the left anterior temporal cortex. So, 
they discussed not only frontal dysfunctions but a fronto-temporal network that plays a 
critical role in moral behavior and that might be dysfunctional in psychopaths (Oliveira-
Souza et al., 2008). 
This assumption is supported by another voxel-based morphometry study by Müller 
et  al.  (2008),  who compared psychopathic  individuals  with PCL-R scores  above 28 
with control subjects (PCL-R scores < 10). They found a significant reduction of gray 
matter  volume in  psychopaths  in  the  right  middle  frontal  gyrus,  the  right  cingulate 
gyrus, and the superior temporal sulcus bilaterally (Müller et al., 2008). 
Summing up structural findings in the frontal cortex in psychopathic or antisocial 
individuals,  it  seems  that  there  is  no  generalized  frontal  cortex  dysfunction  in 
individuals  with  psychopathy but  that  there  are  some special  regions  of  the  frontal 
cortex that could be impaired, e.g. the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)  (Blair, 2003). It is 
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suggested that OFC is directly involved in the modulation of reactive aggression, but it 
is less obviously involved in the modulation of instrumental aggression  (Blair, 2004). 
Furthermore,  the  OFC  is  involved  in  response  reversal.  Impairments  in  response 
reversal are seen in psychopathic individuals (Blair, 2004).
But, not all studies could support frontal dysfunctions in psychopaths, there are also 
contradictory  findings.  For  example,  Dolan  et  al.  (2002)  did  not  find  significantly 
reduced  prefrontal  gray  matter  in  a  structural  MRI  study  in  a  group  of  criminal 
offenders  (18  psychopaths  and  6  patients  with  another  personality  disorder)  in 
comparison  to  control  subjects  (staff  members).  But,  they  revealed  20%  smaller 
temporal lobe volumes in criminal offenders when compared to control subjects (Dolan
et al., 2002). Laakso and colleagues (2002) published contradictory findings, too. They 
investigated  incarcerated  males  with  APD and high PCL-R scores  and did not  find 
differences in total prefrontal, prefrontal white, or gray matter volumes when data were 
controlled for education and duration of alcohol abuse (Laakso et al., 2002).  
Another brain region that seems to be crucially involved in psychopathy besides the 
above mentioned fronto-temporal areas is the amygdala. The amygdalda is thought to 
respond  to  cues  indicating  distress  in  others,  thus  guiding  individuals  away  from 
antisocial behavior  (Blair, 2007b). So, reduced amygdala functioning in psychopathic 
individuals suggests reduced responsiveness to the thought of causing harm to others 
when  contemplating  personal  moral  dilemmas.  In  consequence,  individuals  with 
dysfunctional  amygdala  activation  may  show  conning  and  manipulative  behavior, 
impulsive decision-making, and antisocial and criminal behavior without the feeling of 
guilt or remorse – the typical characteristics of the psychopathic individual (Glenn et al.,
2009). Several studies investigated structural amygdala abnormalities in psychopathic 
individuals.  
In a volumetric neuroimaging study, Tiihonen et al. (2000) showed that amygdala 
dysfunction is associated with psychopathy. They used volumetric magnetic resonance 
imaging  to  explore  the  relationship  between  amygdaloid  volume and  the  degree  of 
psychopathy in violent offenders as measured by the PCL-R and found that high levels 
of  psychopathy  were  associated  with  significantly  reduced  amygdaloid  volume  of 
20-21 % (Tiihonen et al., 2000). These findings were replicated by Yang et al. (2006) 
who  found  significant  reductions  in  the  volume  of  the  amygdala  in  psychopathic 
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individuals in a structural imaging study (Yang et al., 2006). 
In sum, most of the structural brain imaging studies in psychopaths and individuals 
with  antisocial  personality  disorder  found  decreased  prefrontal  cortex  volumes, 
especially in  the frontopolar,  medial  and lateral  orbitofrontal  cortices  (Müller  et  al., 
2008; Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Raine et al., 2000; Yang et al., 2005a; Yang et al., 
2005b).  In  addition  to  frontal  cortex  involvement,  several  studies  showed  volume 
reduction in the anterior temporal cortex and the superior temporal sulcus as well as in 
the amygdala in psychopathic individuals (Müller et al.,  2008; Oliveira-Souza et al., 
2008; Tiihonen et al., 2000; Yang et al., 2006). So, based on structural imaging findings, 
a dysfunctional fronto-temporo-limbic network in psychopaths is discussed (Müller et 
al.,  2008;  Oliveira-Souza  et  al.,  2008).  Functional  imaging studies  that  support  this 
assumption are going to be described in the following part.
2.4.4.2 Functional Brain Abnormalities in Psychopaths
In  addition  to  the  investigated  anatomical  and  structural  brain  abnormalities  in 
psychopathic individuals, there have been some studies that used technologies such as 
functional magnetic resonance imaging in order to reveal functional abnormalities in 
psychopaths. 
A functional imaging study by Soderstrom et  al.  (2002) investigated the regional 
cerebral  blood  flow  by  single-photon  emission  computed  tomography  (SPECT)  in 
psychopathic  personalities  and  found,  especially  in  those  psychopaths  with  a  high 
scoring on factor 1 (deceitful interactive style) of the three-factor model by Cooke and 
Michie (2001), reduced perfusion in medial and lateral frontal areas, in the hippocampus 
and in the amygdala (Soderstrom et al., 2002).
Another functional imaging study was initiated by Müller et al. (2003) who studied 
the  influence  of  affective  contents  and  emotion  processing  on  brain  activation  in 
psychopaths  compared  to  healthy  control  subjects  in  an  fMRI  experiment.  They 
revealed  that  in  psychopaths,  increased  activation  through  negative  contents  during 
watching negative affective pictures was found right-sided in prefrontal regions and in 
the amygdala. Activation was reduced through negative affective pictures right-sided in 
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the subgenual  cingulate  and  the  temporal  gyrus  as  well  as  left-sided  in  the  dorsal 
cingulate.  Increased activation through positive contents  was found left-sided in  the 
orbitofrontal regions. Reduced activation through positive contents was revealed in right 
medial frontal and medial temporal regions (Müller et al., 2003). Müller et al. concluded 
that a deficient functional connectivity of emotion-related brain regions in frontal and 
limbic areas might be the neurobiological reason for the abnormal affective behavior 
that is displayed by psychopaths (Müller et al., 2003).
Kiehl  et  al.  (2001)  investigated  limbic  abnormalities  in  affective  processing  by 
criminal psychopaths in an fMRI study. They examined neural responses in 8 criminal 
psychopaths with high scores on the PCL-R (>28/40), in 8 criminal non-psychopaths 
with low PCL-R scores (<23/40) and in 8 non-criminal control participants during an 
emotional  memory task where  participants  processed words  of  neutral  and negative 
valence  (Kiehl et al., 2001). Compared to criminal non-psychopaths and non-criminal 
controls,  criminal  psychopaths  showed  less  affect-related  activity  during  processing 
emotionally  valenced  words  in  the  rostral  and  caudal  anterior  cingulate,  posterior 
cingulate,  left  inferior  frontal  gyrus,  right  amygdala,  and ventral  striatum.  Criminal 
psychopaths also showed less affect-related activity than non-criminal controls in the 
left  amygdala  and  parahippocampal  gyrus,  and  bilateral  anterior  superior  temporal 
gyrus.  There  were no group differences  in  the  above regions  for  processing neutral 
stimuli  compared  to  the  resting  condition.  Kiehl  and  colleagues  (2001)  draw  the 
conclusion that psychopaths lack appropriate input from limbic structures and therefore, 
they  use  other  cognitive  mechanisms  for  processing  affective  stimuli  (Kiehl  et  al.,
2001).
Whereas  Müller  et  al.  (2003)  revealed  increased  amygdala  activation  during 
watching  negative  affective  pictures,  the  findings  of  Kiehl  et  al.  (2001)  are 
contradictory.  This  discrepancy  of  amygdaloid  activation  may  be  explained  by  the 
different  stimulation  paradigm,  as  Kiehl  et  al.  (2001) used a  memory task whereas 
Müller and colleagues used a visual task (Kiehl et al., 2001; Müller et al., 2003).  
In  another  fMRI  study,  Kiehl  et  al.  (2004)  tested  the  association  between 
psychopathy and abnormalities in a semantic processing task. Therefore, they compared 
brain activations of 8 criminal psychopathic individuals and 8 healthy control subjects 
in a lexial decision task. Kiehl et al. revealed activation deficits of the right posterior 
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superior  temporal  gyrus  in  psychopaths  when  compared  to  control  subjects.  They 
concluded  that  in  psychopaths  there  is  an  abnormality  in  the  function  of  the  right 
anterior superior temporal gyrus (Kiehl et al., 2004). 
Summing up, the predominant conclusion of the findings in previous studies is that 
psychopaths differ from healthy individuals in their neural structures and functioning. It 
is supposed that the neural pathogenesis of psychopathy is based on a disturbed fronto-
temporo-limbic network. On the one hand, this was shown in structural imaging studies. 
On the other hand, functional neuroimaging studies specified these findings and showed 
deficits in the prefrontal cortex, especially in the orbitofrontal cortex, in the cingulate 
gyrus, and in the superior temporal gyrus, as well as in the amygdala when psychopaths 
were tested with tasks on affective or semantic processing, and on decision-making of 
moral dilemmas (Glenn et al., 2009; Kiehl et al., 2001; Kiehl et al., 2004; Müller et al., 
2003). This  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the  pathogenesis  of  social  and  affective 
detachment  and  antisocial  behavior  observed  in  psychopaths  is  underpinned  by  a 
deficient neural network that concerns frontal, temporal and limbic brain areas.
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2.3 Summary and Aim of the Study
In the previous theoretical part, first, a definition and theories of morality and moral 
reasoning, as well as the neural correlates of moral reasoning in healthy individuals 
were described.  Then,  the  concept  of  psychopathy,  theories  on its  development  and 
neural correlates of psychopathy were summarized. 
The first part emphasized the role of morality and normal moral development for an 
individual  within  a  social  group.  Further,  it emphasized  the  role  of  intuitive  and 
emotional processes in human decision-making processes (Greene et al., 2004; Haidt, 
2001) that led to a theory of synthesis of emotion and reasoning in moral processes. In 
addition,  studies  that  investigated  the  neural  correlates  of  moral  decision-making in 
simple moral judgments and moral dilemmas in healthy individuals were described. In 
sum, the findings of these show an involvement of brain areas that are located in frontal, 
parietal  and  temporal  cortices  and  in  limbic  areas.  Specific  brain  areas  that  are 
associated with increased activity in studies with moral decisions are the medial frontal 
gyrus, the orbitofrontal gyrus, the precuneus and the posterior cingulate cortex, the STS 
(TPJ),  the temporal poles,  and the amygdala (Greene et  al.,  2001;  Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Moll et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b) . 
The  second  theoretical  part  of  this  thesis  gave  a  definition  of  the  concept  of 
psychopathy based on Hare's Psychopathy Checklist  (Hare et al., 1991). Furthermore, 
structural and functional brain abnormalities in psychopathic individuals investigated in 
different  neuroimaging  studies  were  described.  In  sum,  a  deficient fronto-temporo-
limbic  network  was  revealed  in  psychopaths.  Specific  brain  regions  that  showed 
impairment  in  psychopathic  individuals  are  the  prefrontal  cortex,  especially  the 
orbitofrontal cortex, the cingulate gyrus, and the superior temporal gyrus, as well as the 
amygdala (Glenn et al., 2009; Kiehl et al., 2001; Kiehl et al., 2004; Müller et al., 2003; 
Müller et al., 2008; Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Raine et al., 2000; Yang et al., 2005a; 
Yang et al., 2005b).
So, whereas the neural correlates of morality and moral decision-making in healthy 
individuals  as  well  as  the  neural  basis  of  emotional  processing  in  psychopaths  is 
relatively well  studied,  the neural  basis  of moral  decision-making in psychopaths  is 
poorly understood.
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The present study attempts to provide further understanding of exactly this point: the 
neural underpinnings of moral decision-making in realistic everyday moral conflicts in 
psychopaths.  This  is  the  first  fMRI  study that  presented  stories  describing  morally 
relevant or neutral (morally irrelevant) situations to psychopathic individuals in order to 
reveal neural processes associated with decision-making in everyday moral conflicts. In 
the moral conflicts condition, subjects had to choose between a morally-guided response 
and  a  personal  desire-guided  (immoral)  response.  In  the  neutral  conflict  condition, 
subjects had to choose between two conflicting personal desires. Participants indicated 
how they would decide if they were in the presented conflicting situation.  After the 
experiment in the scanner, subjects had to indicate their emotion and certainty for each 
decision they made on a questionnaire. 
On  behavioral  level,  it  was  expected  that  psychopaths  would  decide  immorally 
(personal  desire-guided)  more  frequently  than  non-psychopathic  criminal  control 
subjects.  Additionally,  it  was  hypothesized  that  on  the  post-scanning  questionnaire, 
compared  to  the  control  subjects,  psychopaths  would  indicate  higher  emotion  and 
certainty ratings (better feelings and more certainty) when deciding immorally.
In  order  to  reveal  brain  areas  that  are  associated  with  everyday moral  decision-
making in psychopathic individuals, 12 psychopaths were presented with the conflicts 
and the moral conflict condition was contrasted to the neutral conflict condition. For this 
contrast, it was hypothesized that brain areas that are known to be involved in moral 
decision-making processing in healthy individuals such as the medial and orbitofrontal 
gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus, the precuneus and the cingulate cortex region would 
show activation in  psychopaths.  This  implicated the hypothesis  that  everyday moral 
conflicts, as moral dilemmas, would also evoke an activation of moral- and emotion-
related brain areas. It was furthermore hypothesized that psychopaths, when compared 
to non-psychopathic criminal control subjects, would show reduced activation in the 
mentioned brain regions.  
By  testing  all  these  hypotheses,  this  study  could  help  to  extend  functional 
neuroscientific  findings  in  psychopaths  to  a  better  understanding of  everyday moral 
decision-making and its neural underpinnings in psychopaths. Further, it could help to 
provide more information about how psychopaths behave and decide in everyday moral 
conflicting situations and how they feel about their decision.
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In conclusion, this is the first fMRI study on psychopaths that investigates everyday 
moral  conflict  situations  and  the  neural  basis  of  moral  decision-making  in  such 
situations.
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3 METHODS
3.1 Subjects
Altogether, 24 male subjects participated in the present study. The subjects were divided 
into  two groups  depending  on their  total  PCL-R score.  One group consisted  of  12 
criminal  psychopaths  (PCL-R  ≥ 27),  and  the  second  group  consisted  of  12  non-
psychopathic criminal control subjects (PCL-R ≤ 15).  
The age of the 12 male psychopathic subjects ranged from 21 to 50 years, with a 
mean age of 30.75 years (SD = 8.56;  see table  2).  To assess  the mean intelligence 
quotient (IQ) of the subjects, a verbal measure of intelligence was used (Mehrfachwahl-
Wortschatz-Intelligenztest; MWT-B; Lehrl, 2005). The sum of correct answers indicated 
the IQ. In the psychopathic group, IQs ranged from 93 to 118 with a mean of 99.4 (SD 
=  7.06).  Furthermore,  the  Beck's  Depression  Inventory  (BDI)  was  administered  to 
investigate  whether  subjects  showed  signs  of  clinical  depression  (Hautzinger  et  al., 
1994). The test consists of 21 questions that include typical symptoms of patients with 
depression. The test is completed by the subjects themselves and they can reach a sum 
of 0 to 63 points as every item is assessed with 0 to 3 points. In the psychopathic group, 
the mean BDI score was 13.5 with a SD of 10.15 (see table 2). All participants were free 
from clinical  depression.  To assess  the  score  on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
(PCL-R; Hare et  al.,  1991),  two independent  raters interviewed each subject  with a 
semi-structured interview according to the PCL-R and completed the given information 
with the files of the subjects.  The affective-interpersonal  factor 1 and the antisocial 
behavior indicating factor 2 were analyzed separately.  The maximum score is 16 on 
factor 1 and 18 on factor 2, and 40 for the total PCL-R score. Psychopathic subjects had 
a total PCL-R score range from 27 to 35 with a mean of 28.91 and SD of 2.3 (see table 
2). Their scoring on factor 1 ranged from 7 to 14 (Mean = 10.3, SD = 2.11) and from 14 
to 17 on factor 2 (Mean = 15.3, SD = 0.82). For the psychopathic group a cutoff score of 
more than 26 total points on the PCL-R was defined.
The  same  data  were  collected  of  each  subject  in  the  non-psychopathic  criminal 
control group (see means and SD in figure 2). The mean age of this group was 28.83 
years (SD = 3.88, range = 23-36; see figure 2). According to the MWT-B the IQ ranged 
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from 88 to 104 (Mean = 94, SD = 4.9). In the non-psychopathic group, the mean BDI 
score was 9.67 (SD = 4.21, range = 4-17) and all control subjects were free from clinical 
depression. Subjects of this control group had a total PCL-R score range from 2 to 15 
(Mean = 10.67, SD = 4.44) and a mean of 2.42 on factor 1 (SD = 1.98, range = 0-6) and 
of 6.83 on factor 2 (SD = 3.54, range = 0-11). For the non-psychopathic criminal control 
group a cutoff score below 16 total points on the PCL-R was defined.
All 24 subjects of the two groups were right-handed and had a normal or corrected to 
normal vision.  Exclusion criteria  were a history of other  neurological  or psychiatric 
disorders as well as organic or traumatic head injuries, metallic implants and a total 
PCL-R score  between  16  and  26.  These  criteria  were  excluded  in  all  participating 
subjects.   .   
All  24  subjects  were  recruited  from  the  Clinic  of  Forensic  Psychiatry  of  the 
University Medical Center of Regensburg, Germany. Subjects were informed about the 
study by a  short  presentation  in  a  meeting  of  their  ward.  All  subjects  gave  written 
informed consent according to the guidelines of the local Ethics Committee. Regarding 
their participation and statements, data protection was confirmed. The participation of 
all subjects was voluntary and they received no payment for it. At request, a printed 
image of the brain was given to the subject.
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Table 2. Demographic data of the criminal psychopathic individuals.  This table shows age and total 
PCL-R score of each psychopathic subject. Furthermore, it shows the different scoring of each subject on 
factor 1 (affective-interpersonal factor) and factor 2 (antisocial factor) of the PCL-R. The scoring on the  
Beck's Depression Inventory (BDI) is shown to indicate signs of clinical depression. In addition, the IQ 
was calculated by the scoring on a verbal measure of intelligence (MWT-B).
Subject 
number
Age (years) PCL-R total 
score
(max 40)
PCL-R 
factor 1 
score 
(max 16)
PCL-R 
factor 2 
score 
(max 18)
BDI IQ
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
33
24
50
31
22
26
27
30
40
21
26
39
28
29
27
29
28
27
28
30
35
27
29
30
12
10
11
  9
11
  8
12
12
14
  9
13
  7
15
16
15
15
16
15
16
15
15
14
17
17
18
  5
  2
  9
14
  1
  9
18
  6
18
32
30
  94
118
100
  95
100
  94
100
  95
  97
  93
100
107
Mean 30.75 28.91 10.3 15.3 13.5   99.4
SD   8.56   2.3   2.11   0.82 10.15     7.06
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Figure 2. Comparison of age, total PCL-R scores, BDI and MWT-B between criminal psychopaths 
and non-psychopathic criminal control subjects.  The bars show age, total score on the Psychopathic 
Checklist – Revised (PCL-R), Beck's Depression Inventory (BDI) and MWT-B. The MWT-B indicates 
the IQ. The mean MWT-B score of  23 of the non-psychopathic criminal control group indicates a mean  
IQ of 94 for this group whereas the mean MWT-B of 26 in the psychopathic group indicates a mean IQ of  
97 for the psychopathic group.
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3.2 Stimuli
Stimuli consisted of a total of 56 stories that described conflicts with either moral or 
neutral content. The 28 stories describing a moral conflict (Moral Conflicts condition) 
required subjects to choose between a moral, socially desired response and a conflicting 
immoral, personal desire guided response (e.g. helping the elderly lady to pick up her 
purchases as a socially desired and moral decision or taking the bus home that leaves 
only every two hours as a personal desire guided decision; see figure 3). The 28 neutral 
stories without moral content (Neutral Conflicts condition) described conflicts requiring 
a decision between two conflicting personal desires (e.g.  choosing between pasta or 
pizza in a restaurant).
The course of trial presentation was equal in both conditions. First, the conflict was 
presented  in  first-person  narrative  text  form  together  with  the  concluding  question 
“What should I do?”. This slide remained on the screen for 15 seconds. To account for 
differences in average length and reading time between the stories, all conflicts were 
rated by 23 independent raters. The presentation of the conflict was followed by a slide 
presentation with the two possible response alternatives depicted in two boxes at the 
center of the screen. This slide was presented for 5 seconds. Subjects were instructed to 
press the button not yet but to wait for the presentation of the next slide which displayed 
the letters “A” above the left  response alternative and “B” above the right response 
alternative on the display.  This instruction was important in order to exclude neural 
activation caused by motor processes.  Subjects were instructed to now press one of two 
buttons of the response pad with their right index and middle finger. If they chose the 
response alternative presented on the left side of the display and marked with the letter 
“A”, subjects  pressed the left  button with their  right  index finger.  For choosing the 
response alternative presented on the right side of the display and marked with the letter 
“B”, they pressed the right button of the response pad with their right middle finger. The 
last slide of each trial consisted of a fixation cross that was presented at the center of the 
display. The duration of the fixation cross presentation varied randomly between 8 and 
12 seconds in order to jitter the trial onset time. A schematic depiction of a trial with 
respective durations is shown in figure 3.
The presentation of moral and neutral conflicts was in random order. The allocation 
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of the finger to the answer was counterbalanced as well.
Entire scanning time for functional image acquisition was approximately 30 minutes. 
After the functional T2* image acquisition, a structural image of the subject's brain was 
obtained, lasting some 7 minutes. So, the entire scanning time for every subject was 
approximately 37 minutes.
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Figure 3.  Schematic depiction of  a  moral conflict  trial  with respective durations. The first  slide 
presented  the  conflict  for  a  duration  of  15  seconds.  With  the  second slide  the  response  alternatives 
appeared on the screen for 5 seconds. Subjects were instructed to press the response button when the 
letters “A” and “B” appeared with the third slide that remained on the screen for 2 seconds. After each 
trial, a fixation cross was presented during a fixation period lasting between 8 and 12 seconds.
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Auf der Straße sehe ich, wie eine alte Frau stolpert und 
ihre Einkäufe auf den Boden rollen. Nebenan sehe ich 
meinen Bus stehen, der nur alle 2 Stunden fährt. Außer 
der Frau bin ich der einzige Mensch in der Umgebung.
Wie verhalte ich mich?
Helfe der alten Frau Nehme den Bus
Helfe der alten Frau Nehme den Bus
15 sec
5 sec
8-12 sec
A B
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3.3 Experimental Design
Subjects  came  to  the  MRI  room  of  University  Medical  Center  Regensburg  by 
themselves or were accompanied by clinical staff or security service. After the greeting, 
subjects  were  asked  again  for  any  contraindications  for  the  fMRI  experiment.  The 
course and duration of the experiment was explained to the subjects and any question of 
the subjects was answered. When subjects had no more doubts and were still willing to 
participate,  they  signed  a  letter  of  agreement.  Then,  subjects  got  standardized 
instructions and it was emphasized that they should put themselves in the place of the 
protagonist described in the conflicts and choose the answer they would also choose in 
real life. Prior to the experiment in the scanner, subjects received a training session on a 
standard PC outside the scanner that consisted of 4 moral and 4 neutral conflicts. None 
of these presented training conflicts were used in the subsequent fMRI experiment. In 
this training session, subjects were instructed to press a button for their decision not 
until the appearance of the letters “A” and “B” above the response alternatives.
Before subjects entered the MR room, they were asked to remove all metallic objects 
from their pockets, clothes and bodies. In the MR room, subjects were instructed to sit  
down on the lie down area of the MR-system and earplugs and headphones were handed 
to them to protect them from noise. Then they were asked to lie down and to place the 
head in the correct position where it was fixed with two foam pads to avoid motion. For 
the same reason, subjects were instructed to move the least as possible during the entire 
scanning experiment. The response pad was given to the subjects and again they were 
told which buttons should be pressed by the index and middle finger of the right hand. 
They were asked to position the right hand with relaxed fingers above the buttons of the 
response pad close to their  right thigh.  An alarm button was handed to the subjects 
which was held with the left hand. It was explained to the subjects to use the alarm 
button in case of emergency (such as sudden claustrophobia) and that the experiment 
could be stopped in any moment. Then subjects were positioned in the MR tomograph. 
The  experiment  was  generated  with  Presentation  11.3  software  (Neurobehavioral 
Systems  Inc.,  Albany,  CA).  Inside  the  scanner,  stimuli  were  back-projected  onto  a 
mirror. The subjects' responses in the scanner were retrieved with LUMItouch optical 
response  device  (Photo  Control,  Burnaby,  Canada)  and  were  also  recorded  with 
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Presentation 11.3.
Subjects were asked if  they were ready for the experiment.  None of the subjects 
expressed any doubts and none of them interrupted the scanning process. Prior to the 
experiment, an anatomical reference image was obtained. Then the experiment started 
with the presentation of 56 moral and neutral conflicts presented in random order. After 
the  conflict  experiment,  subjects  were  asked  to  remain  relaxed  and  calm  for  a 
subsequent structural image acquisition. When the scanning process finished, subjects 
were asked to remove the equipment that was handed to them for the experiment, and to 
get up slowly.
After  the  scanning  experiment,  subjects  were  kindly  requested  to  complete  a 
questionnaire that contained the 56 moral and neutral conflicts presented in the scanner 
but in a deviating order. They were asked to indicate their responses once again and to 
evaluate their certainty (how sure they were about the decision) and their emotions (how 
good they felt with their decision) for each decision. The two latter questions had to be 
answered by means of a 5-point scale (certainty: 1 = extremely uncertain, 5 = extremely 
certain; emotion: 1 = extremely bad feeling, 5 = extremely good feeling).
The investigator returned all private items to the subjects, thanked the subjects for 
their  participation  and  the  subjects  returned  to  their  wards  by  themselves  or 
accompanied by clinical staff or security service.
 
 
3.4 fMRI Parameters
Functional MRI imaging was recorded with a 3-Tesla Siemens Allegra Head Scanner 
(Siemens  Inc.,  Erlangen,  Germany)  located  at  the  University  Medical  Center 
Regensburg  for  measuring  the  blood-oxygen  level-dependent  (BOLD)  contrast.  The 
scanner acquired echo-planar-imaging (EPI) sequences using fast gradients. During T2* 
data acquisition, 32 slices were recorded (whole brain; slice thickness = 3mm, no skip) 
in interleaved order with a Time-to-Repeat (TR) of 2000ms, a Time-to-Echo (TE) of 
30ms, a flip angel of 90°, a Field of View (FoV) of 192 x 192 mm and a voxel size of 3 
x 3 x 3 mm. A total of 964 functional images were recorded in the entire experiment. 
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After the T2* data acquisition, a structural image was recorded from every subject. 
These  high-resolution  T1-weighted  images  were  obtained  using  a  MPRAGE 
(Magnetization  Prepared  Rapid  Acquisition  Gradient  Echo)  pulse  sequence  (TR  = 
2250ms, TE = 3.93ms, flip angle = 9°, FoV = 256 x 256 mm) scanning 160  axial slices 
with isotropic voxels of 1 x 1 x 1 mm.
3.5 Statistical Analysis
3.5.1 Analysis of Behavioral Data
The statistical analysis of the behavioral data acquired during the fMRI experiment as 
well as from the post-scanning questionnaire were processed with SPSS 16 software 
package (SPSS Corp., Chicago, IL). The non-parametric Wilcoxon-Test was used for 
the number of moral and immoral answers in the moral conflicts. For analyzing the 
certainty about the decisions and the emotional reaction during the decision process, 
paired T-tests were used.
3.5.2 Analysis of Functional Imaging Data
All functional imaging data were preprocessed and analyzed statistically with SPM5 
software  package  (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/spm5/)  based  on  Matlab 
7.0 software (The Math Works Inc., Natick, MA). 
3.5.2.1 Data Preprocessing
The  first  step  of  the  preprocessing  was  the  transformation  from DICOM to  NIFTI 
format. The recording format of functional and structural imaging data in the fMRI was 
DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine). For further preprocessing 
and analyzing steps, data had to be transformed into a format that is  recognized by 
SPM5. This format is called NIFTI (Neuroimaging Informatics Technology Initiative).
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The second preprocessing step was the slice timing. As the recording of the 32 slices 
was  in  an  interleaved  fashion,  which  means  that  slices  with  an  even  number  were 
recorded  first  (in  the  following  order:  1,  3,  5,  ...29,  31,  2,  4,  ...30,  32),  the  time 
difference between the recording of two adjacent slices was ½ of the time-to-repeat 
(TR). The interleaved measuring has the advantage that slices next to each other do not 
interfere with each other. The result is a more accurate estimate of the hemodynamic 
response function. It is necessary to correct the staggered order of image acquisition and 
to make the data on each slice correspond to the same point in time. This leads to a 
slightly shift of the original data. So, all 966 image volumes were slice-timed to account 
for differences in acquisition time. Therefore, the middle slice was used as a reference 
slice  (Henson et al., 1999). 
Next, realignment routine was done to account for motion artefacts. For this routine, 
a time-series of functional images were realigned to a representative reference scan. The 
first volume of a scan was chosen as the reference scan. In addition, a functional mean 
image was generated for further use in the following preprocessing steps. 
In the coregistration step, this functional mean image was realigned to the subject's 
structural image. The result  is a structural three-dimensional image in order to yield 
more accurate normalization estimates in the subsequent preprocessing step. 
In the next step, functional images were normalized to a standard template brain that 
represents  an  average  of  structural  brain  images  from  several  subjects  that  were 
recorded at the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI). This normalization routine is 
necessary for the comparability of all single-subjects in a group analysis. 
In the last step, image volumes were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel of a specified 
width. In the present study a 8 mm full-width half-maximum Gaussian filter was used 
for smoothing. This routine is used to suppress noise and effects that are due to residual 
functional and anatomical inter-individual differences.
3.5.2.2 Statistical Analysis of Functional Imaging Data
After the previous preprocessing steps, individual first-level regressors were specified. 
Regressors represent time intervals that are of particular interest to the study. In the 
present  study,  6  regressors  were  modelled,  three  of  them  in  the  Moral  Conflicts 
condition  and  three  in  the  Neutral  Conflicts  condition.  The  first  regressor  of  both 
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conditions lasted 15s and covered the duration of the entire conflict presentation on the 
first slide. The second regressor in every condition comprised the presentation time of 
the  response  alternatives  on  the  second  slide  (5s).  And  the  third  regressor  in  each 
condition  comprised  the  third slide which  showed the response alternatives  and the 
letters  “A” and “B” (2s).  The appearance  of  the  two letters  was  the  signal  for  the 
subjects to press a response button. In addition, 6 more regressors were modelled which 
included translation and rotation parameters of the subject's movement. 
An estimation of the statistical  significance on single-subject level for the hereby 
created model was based on the assumptions of the General Linear Model (GLM) that 
includes multiple t-tests.
In a first analysis, the first regressor (comprising the conflict presentation) in the 
Moral Conflicts condition was contrasted to the first regressor in the Neutral Conflicts 
condition in order to identify brain regions  that  are  associated with everyday moral 
reasoning. Therefore, activity during conflict and question presentation during the first 
regressor  in  the  Neutral  Conflicts  condition  was  subtracted  from the  corresponding 
activity  in  the  Moral  Conflicts  condition.  This  contrast  was  analyzed  for  both,  the 
psychopathic group and the non-psychopathic criminal control group.
A second  analysis  of  the  moral  conflict  condition  was  applied,  but  only  for  the 
psychopathic group. The focus of this analysis was to identify brain areas related to 
immoral decision-making. For this purpose the contrast immoral decision versus moral 
decision was analyzed only in those psychopathic individual subjects who had decided 
immorally in at least 30% of the moral conflicts (equal to at least 8 immoral answers out 
of  28 moral  conflicts).  Eight  of  the  12  psychopathic  subjects  decided at  least  30% 
immorally in the conflicts with moral content. The first-level analysis of this additional 
analysis corresponded to the first analysis with the exception that the regressor Moral 
Conflicts  was divided into the regressors  Immoral  Decision and Moral  Decision.  In 
order  to  identify  brain  activity  related  to  choosing  immoral  decisions  over  moral 
decisions, activity in the Moral Decision was subtracted from the Immoral Decision 
condition.
After the estimation of both different first-level analyses on single subject level, the 
results were introduced into two group analyses. A random-effect analysis that accounts 
for  individual  functional  and  anatomical  variability  among  the  single  subjects  was 
47
Methods
conducted for this purpose.
Significant activation of a brain region was reported if the corrected p-value did not 
surpass the statistical treshold of P < 0.05.
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4 RESULTS 
4.1 Behavioral Data
4.1.1 Behavioral Data from the fMRI Scanning Experiment 
4.1.1.1 Psychopathic Individuals
In the Moral Conflicts condition, the number of given immoral answers varied from 
only  one  immoral  answer  (out  of  28  answers)  up  to  23  immoral  answers  in  the 
psychopathic group (see table 3). With a mean of 11.08 immoral answers, which is 
equal to an average of 39.57%, a SD of 6.75 points out the wide span of the quantity of  
given immoral answers. According to that, the mean number of given moral answers in 
the Moral Conflict condition within the psychopathic group was 15.92 with a SD of 
6.79 (see table 3). So, psychopathic individuals gave 56,86% morally-guided responses. 
The difference between the average of personal desire-guided immoral answers and the 
average of  morally-guided responses was statistically not significant  (Wilcoxon Z = 
-1.099; p = 0.272, n.s.). Misses in the Moral Conflicts condition occurred with a mean 
of 2.00 (SD = 0,63).
In  the  Neutral  Conflict  condition,  psychopathic  subjects  chose  one  of  the  two 
presented responses with conflicting personal desires in 97 % of all presented neutral 
conflicts  (Mean = 27.17, SD = 1.34).  The mean of  misses  in  the Neutral  Conflicts 
condition was 2.5 (SD = 1).
Mean  reaction  time  (RT)  when  psychopathic  subjects  chose  the  immoral  and 
personal  desire-guided answer  in  the  Moral  Conflict  condition  was  876.57 ms  (SD 
341.75 ms). Mean RT when choosing the morally-guided responses was 785.64 ms (SD 
153.33 ms). The mean RT in the Neutral Conflicts condition amounted to 688.27 ms 
(SD 169.87 ms).  A detailed description of mean reaction times (RT) and amount of 
given answers of every psychopathic subject in each condition is shown in table 3.  
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Table 3. Number and reaction time of each psychopathic subject in moral, immoral and neutral 
answers.  This table indicates the number of chosen moral or immoral answers and neutral answers of  
each subject in the psychopathic group and shows the reaction time (RT) for all types of answers and for  
every psychopathic subject  in  the scanner.  In  the  Moral  Conflict  condition,  psychopathic individuals 
chose the moral  answer with a mean of 15.92 (SD = 6,79) and the immoral,  personal desire-guided 
answer with a mean of 11.08 (SD = 6.75).
Subject
number
Moral answers Immoral answers Neutral answers
Number RT [ms] Number RT [ms] Number RT [ms]
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
16
14
23
11
3
22
21
18
9
16
11
27
699.87
663.39
799.89
1089.77
785.53
875.73
995.10
618.70
763.21
683.33
877.91
575.24
10
11
3
16
23
4
7
10
19
12
17
1
84.94
708.09
885.37
1005.25
689.68
765.96
971.98
549.39
648.39
788.02
841.76
1880.00
28
25
28
25
28
25
28
28
28
28
28
27
666.38
677.85
743.90
997.74
619.25
440.94
899.38
593.89
594.46
636.28
903.15
486.07
Mean 15.92 785.64 11.08 876.57 27.17 688.27
SD 6.79 153.33 6.75 341.75 1.34 169.87
4.1.1.2 Non-Psychopathic Criminal Control Group
In  the  Moral  Conflicts  condition,  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  chose 
significantly more often moral responses (M = 20.0; SD = 6.9) than responses fulfilling 
a conflicting immoral personal desire (Mean = 5.72; SD = 4.22; Wilcoxon Z = -2.805; p 
≤ 0.005). Mean miss rate in the Moral Conflicts condition was 4.17 (SD = 7.76). In the 
Neutral Conflict condition, non-psychopathic criminal control subjects chose one of two 
presented conflicting personal desires with a mean of 25.73 (SD = 5.9). The mean of 
misses in the Neutral Conflicts condition was 5.5 (SD = 6.45).
Mean RT when subjects chose the immoral response was 754.52 s (SD = 199.07ms) 
and 746.03 ms (SD = 175.65 ms) when choosing the morally-guided response. Overall 
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RT in the Moral Conflicts condition independent of the subject's response choice was 
751.82 (SD = 175.04). In the Neutral Conflicts condition, mean RT was 718.31 ms (SD 
= 166.21).
4.1.1.3 Statistical Comparison Between the Psychopathic and the Non-
Psychopathic Criminal Control Group
The  amount  of  immoral  and  moral  decisions  in  the  Moral  Conflict  condition  was 
compared between the psychopathic and the non-psychopathic criminal control subjects 
(see figure 4). In the psychopathic group, there was a statistical tendency towards more 
immoral personal desire-guided decisions compared to the non-psychopathic criminal 
control group (Mann-Whitney-U: 37.0; p = 0.073). For the amount of moral decisions in 
the  Moral  Conflict  condition,  there  was  no  significant  difference  between  the  two 
groups (Mann-Whitney-U: 40.0; p = 0.109, n.s.). 
Figure 4. Behavioral results during scanning. This figure shows a comparison between the amount of 
immoral  and moral  answers  in the psychopathic group and in the non-psychopathic criminal  control 
group during scanning. There is a statistical tendency that psychopaths decide immorally more frequently 
than  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  (°).  The  amount  of  moral  decisions  does  not  differ 
significantly  between  the  two  groups.  Whereas  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  decide 
significantly more moral than immoral (*), this difference is not significant in the psychopathic group. 
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4.1.2 Behavioral Data from the Post-Scanning Questionnaire
The analyses of the post-scanning behavioral data confirmed the response pattern of the 
scanning  procedure  and  provided  further  information  about  the  emotions  and  the 
certainty of the subjects concerning the decisions they made. 
4.1.2.1 Psychopathic Individuals
In  the  Moral  Conflict  condition,  psychopathic  participants  chose  morally-guided 
responses with a mean number of M = 15.18 (SD = 5.95) and immoral personal desire-
guided decisions with a mean number of M = 12.73 (SD = 5.95; see table 4).  The 
difference was statistically not significant.
A further analysis of the moral conflicts showed that immoral decisions in contrast to 
morally-guided  decisions  were  associated  with  significantly  lower  emotion  rating 
(immoral decisions: M = 3.43; SD = 0.96; moral decisions: M = 4.17; SD = 0.83; t(344) 
= 7.7; p < 0.001) and with significantly lower certainty ratings (immoral decisions: M = 
3.98; SD = 1.11; moral decisions: M = 4.62; SD = 0.77; t(344) = 6.3; p < 0.001) (see 
table 4 and figures 5 and 6).
For the comparison between the Moral Conflicts condition and the Neutral Conflicts 
condition in psychopaths,  a  statistical  analysis  was not  done as the Moral  Conflicts 
condition subsumes emotions and certainty for both decisions, moral as well as immoral 
decisions.  Therefore,  a  statistical  analysis  of  all  Moral  Conflicts  would  not  be 
representative. So, a non-statistical comparison for the Moral Conflicts condition and 
the Neutral Conflicts condition revealed a mean certainty of M = 4.34 (SD = 0.55) in 
moral situations and a mean certainty of M = 4.38 (SD = 0.48) in the neutral condition. 
The mean emotion rating in moral situations was M = 3.85 (SD = 0.48 ) and M = 4.06 
(SD = 0.51) in neutral situations.  
Table 4 shows the number of given moral, immoral and neutral answers as well as 
the associated emotion and certainty ratings of each subject in the psychopathic group. 
The  data  of  subject  number  12  are  missing,  because  the  patient  was  transferred  to 
another clinic and therefore, he could not return his questionnaire.
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Table 4. Post-scanning questionnaire data of psychopathic individuals. This table shows the number 
of given moral, immoral and neutral answers of each subject. Furthermore, it shows their emotions (E)  
and certainty (C) which were scored on a 5-point scale from 1 = very bad feeling / very uncertain to 5 = 
very good feeling / very certain.
Subject
number
Moral answers Immoral answers Neutral answers
Number E C Number E C Number E C
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
15
13
24
13
4
22
20
18
9
18
11
-
4.13
4.85
4.42
4.08
5.00
3.45
3.55
4.28
4.22
3.61
4.54
-
4.93
5.00
4.33
3,85
5.00
4.86
4.80
4.00
4.89
4.27
4.82
-
12
15
4
15
24
6
8
10
19
10
17
-
3.75
3.13
3.75
2.40
3.96
2.17
3.36
3.90
3.37
2.90
4.06
-
4.17
3.40
2.25
3.13
4.92
4.50
4.63
2.90
4.16
2.60
5.00
-
28
28
28
27
28
28
28
28
28
28
28
-
4.04
4.64
4.36
3.63
4.89
3.25
4.61
4.07
3.71
3.36
4.00
-
4.43
4.71
4.29
3.37
4.93
4.68
4.79
3.68
4.39
3.89
4.79
-
Mean 15.18 4.19 4.61 12.73 3.34 3.79 27.91 4.05 4.36
SD 5.95 0.51 0.42 5.95 0.64 0.97 0.3 0.54 0.51
4.1.2.2 Non-Psychopathic Criminal Control Group
In  the  Moral  Conflicts  condition,  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  chose 
morally-guided responses  with a  mean of  20.55 (SD = 5.63)  and immoral  personal 
desire-guided decisions with a mean of 7.45 (SD = 5.54). 
In a further analysis of the moral conflicts it was shown that immoral decisions in 
contrast to morally-guided decisions were associated with significantly lower certainty 
ratings (immoral decisions: M = 4.04; SD = 1.03; moral decisions: M = 4.60; SD = 
0.73;  t(331)  =  5.52;  p  <  0.001)  and  significantly  lower  emotion  rating  (immoral 
decisions: M = 3.02; SD = 1.14; moral decisions: M = 4.41; SD = 0.98; t(331) = 10.71; 
p < 0.001; see figures 5 and 6).
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The comparison between the Moral Conflicts condition and the Neutral  Conflicts 
condition  revealed  that  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  reported  lower 
certainty during decision-making in moral situations than in neutral situations (moral 
situations: M = 4.46; SD = 0.38; neutral situations: M = 4.43; SD = 0.37) and lower 
emotion ratings (moral situations: M = 4.07; SD = 0.60; neutral situations: M = 4.17; 
SD = 0.44).  
4.1.2.3 Statistical  Comparison  Between  the  Psychopathic  and  the  Non-
Psychopathic Criminal Control Group
The results of the post-scanning behavioral data were statistically compared between 
both groups, the psychopathic group and the non-psychopathic criminal control group. 
When compared to the non-psychopathic criminal control group, in the psychopathic 
group there was a statistical  tendency towards more immoral personal desire-guided 
decisions (Mann-Whitney-U: 37.0; p = 0.073). For the amount of moral decisions in the 
Moral Conflict condition, there was no significant difference between the two groups 
(Mann-Whitney-U: 40.0; p = 0.0109, n.s.).
Within the Moral Conflicts condition, non-psychopathic criminal subjects reported 
significantly  higher  emotion  ratings  than  psychopaths  when  they  chose  a  morally-
guided response (non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects:  M = 4.41,  SD = 0.98; 
psychopaths: M = 4.17, SD = 0.83; t(449) = -2.7; p < 0.01). When deciding immorally 
and personal-desire guided, psychopaths reported significantly higher emotion ratings 
than non-psychopathic criminal control subjects (psychopaths: M = 3.43, SD = 0.96; 
non-psychopathic criminal control subjects: M = 3.02, SD = 1.14; t(226) = 2.85; p < 
0.01).  Concerning  certainty  ratings  in  the  Moral  Conflict  condition,  there  were  no 
significant  differences  between  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  and 
psychopaths when choosing a moral option (non-psychopathic criminal control subjects: 
M = 4.60, SD = 0.73; psychopaths: M = 4.62, SD = 0.77; t(449) = 0.18; p = 0.855, n.s.) 
and  when  choosing  the  personal  desire-guided  option  (non-psychopathic  criminal 
control subjects: M = 4.04, SD = 1.03; psychopaths: M = 3.98, SD = 1.11; t(226) = -  
0.381; p = 0.704, n.s.). Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the differences between both groups 
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concerning emotion and certainty in the post-scanning data comparison.
In the Neutral Conflicts condition, there were no significant differences between both 
groups concerning emotion ratings (t(22) = 0.527; p = 0.603, n.s.) and certainty ratings 
(t(22) = 0.323; p = 0.75, n.s.). 
Figure  5.  Post-scanning data  comparison of  emotion  ratings  in  criminal  psychopaths and non-
psychopathic criminal  control  subjects.  This figure shows the differences of  emotion ratings when 
psychopathic inidividuals (left  side) and non-psychopathic criminal  control subjects (right side) chose 
morally-guided  responses  (orange  bars),  personal  desire-guided  responses  (red  bars)  and  neutral 
responses  (blue bars).  In  both groups,  choosing an immoral  option compared to a  moral  option was 
associated with significantly lower emotions (*). Compared to psychopaths, non-psychopathic criminal 
individuals reported significantly higher emotion ratings when choosing a morally-guided response (*).  
When choosing an immoral decision, psychopaths reported significantly higher emotion ratings than non-
psychopathic criminal control subjects (*).
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Figure 6.  Post-scanning data comparison of  certainty ratings in criminal psychopaths and non-
psychopathic criminal control subjects.  This figure shows the differences of certainty ratings when 
psychopathic (left side) and non-psychopathic criminal control subjects (right side) chose morally-guided 
responses (orange bars), personal desire-guided responses (red bars) and neutral responses (blue bars). In  
both groups, choosing an immoral option compared to a moral option was associated with significantly 
lower certainty (*).
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4.2 Functional Imaging Data 
4.2.1 Contrast Moral > Neutral
In the contrast Moral > Neutral, activity during conflict and question presentation in the 
Neutral Conflicts condition was subtracted from the corresponding activity in the Moral 
Conflicts condition in order to reveal brain regions that are dedicated to everyday moral 
reasoning.  This  contrast  was  analyzed  for  psychopathic  individuals  and  for  non-
psychopathic criminal control subjects.
4.2.1.1 Psychopathic Individuals
Psychopathic individuals showed significant activation in the moral > neutral contrast in 
the medial and superior frontal gyrus bilaterally (BA 9/10/11), in the superior temporal 
gyrus bilaterally and the supramarginal gyrus bilaterally (BA 39/40), in the left-sided 
middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), in the right posterior cingulate (BA 31), bilaterally in 
the cingulate gyrus (BA 31) and in the precuneus (BA 7; see table 5). Figure 7 illustrates 
the activation of the contrast moral > neutral in psychopaths.
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Table 5. Brain regions with significantly increased activation in psychopathic individuals in the 
moral > neutral condition. 12  psychopathic individuals, T = 4, voxel size: 2 x 2 x 2 mm
Region Brodmann 
Area (BA)
Center MNI 
coordinates in mm
      x            y          z
Z-score Voxels 
(n)
M > N
Posterior cingulate (R)
Cingulate Gyrus (L/R)
Precuneus
7/31 4 -58 34 5.14 1170
Medial Frontal Gyrus (L/R)
Superior Frontal Gyrus (L/R)
9/10 -2 58 34 4.43 690
Superior Temporal Gyrus (L)
Supramarginal Gyrus (L)
39 -50 -60 28 4.84 611
Superior Temporal Gyrus (R)
Supramarginal Gyrus (R)  
39/40 54 -52 22 4.18 331
Middle Temporal Gyrus (L) 21 -62 -12 -12 4.40 195
Medial Frontal Gyrus (L/R) 11 4 58 -16 4.23 123
Clusters with p (corrected) < 0.05 are listed. x, y, z are coordinates according to MNI system.  L, left; R,  
right.
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Figure  7.  A-D: Significant  brain activity in  psychopaths in  the moral  > neutral  contrast  on a 
sectional view at MNI coordinates x = 4, y = 58 and z = 22. The figure shows different brain areas that 
activated significantly in the moral > neutral contrast in a moral conflict decision-making task in criminal  
psychopaths. Significant activated areas are shown in yellow/orange color. A: Significant brain activation 
in the posterior cingulate, the cingulate gyrus and the precuneus and in the medial and superior frontal 
gyrus and in the medial frontal gyrus bilaterally. B: Significant brain activation in the medial and superior 
frontal  gyrus  bilaterally. C:  Significant  brain  activation  in  the  left  superior  temporal  gyrus  and 
supramarginal gyrus and in the right superior temporal gyrus und supramarginal gyrus as well as in the  
posterior cingulate, cingulate gyrus and precuneus region and in the medial and superior frontal gyrus.  D: 
Glass brain showing significant activation in the aforementioned areas plus in the left middle temporal 
gyrus.
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4.2.1.2 Non-Psychopathic Criminal Control Subjects
In order to reveal brain regions that are involved in everyday moral reasoning in non-
psychopathic criminal control subjects, the contrast Moral > Neutral was analyzed. In 
the control  group, this  contrast  highlighted significant  activations  in  the medial  and 
superior frontal gyrus (BA 6/9/10), the inferior and middle temporal gyrus bilaterally 
(BA 20/21), the right superior temporal gyrus (BA 22/38), the supramarginal gyrus and 
the left angular gyrus (BA 39/40), the cingulate gyrus bilaterally (BA 31), the posterior 
cingulate (BA 31), the precuneus bilaterally (BA 7) and the right cuneus (BA 18) (see 
table 6). The activation of this contrast is illustrated in figure 8.
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Table 6. Brain areas with significantly increased activation in the non-psychopathic criminal control 
group in the moral > neutral contrast. 12 non-psychopathic criminal individuals, T = 4, voxel size: 2 x 
2 x 2 mm
Region Brodmann 
Area (BA)
Center MNI 
coordinates in mm
      x            y          z
Voxels (n)
M > N
Cingulate Gyrus (L/R)
Precuneus (L/R)
31
7
-4 -46 38 1138
Superior Temporal Gyrus (R) 
Inferior Temporal Gyrus (R)
Middle Temporal Gyrus (R) 
22/38
20
21
64 -12 -8 896
Superior Frontal Gyrus (R)
Medial Frontal Gyrus (L/R)
9
10
6 58 12 700
Middle Temporal Gyrus (L)
Supramarginal Gyrus, Angular 
Gyrus (L)
21
39/40
-62 -58 20 611
Superior Frontal Gyrus (L) 6 -4 12 74 154
Middle Temporal Gyrus (L)
Inferior Temporal Gyrus (L)
21
20
-52 -10 -16 153
Cuneus (R)
Posterior Cingulate (L/R)
18
31
98 4 -60 98
Clusters with p (corrected ) < 0.05 are listed. x, y, z are coordinates according to MNI system.  L, left; R,  
right.
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Figure 8. A-D: Significant brain activity in the non-psychopathic criminal control group in the 
moral > neutral contrast on a sectional view at MNI coordinates x = 4, y = 58 and z = 16.  Brain 
areas  that  showed  significantly increased  activation  in  the  moral  condition  compared  to  the  neutral 
condition in non-psychopathic criminal control subjects are shown in orange color.  A: Significant brain 
activation in the medial and superior frontal gyrus bilaterally, in the left superior frontal gyrus, in the 
cingulate  gyrus  and  precuneus  region  bilaterally  and  in  the  cuneus  and  posterior  cingulate  gyrus 
bilaterally B:  Significant  brain  activation  in  the  medial  and  superior  frontal  gyrus  bilaterally.  C: 
Significant brain activation in the right superior temporal gyrus and in the left supramarginal and angular 
gyrus as well as in the medial and superior frontal gyrus. D: Glass brain showing significant activation in 
the medial  and superior frontal  gyrus (BA 9/10), in the superior frontal  gyrus (around BA 6),  in the 
superior temporal and supramarginal gyrus as well as in the middle temporal gyrus and temporal pole.
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4.2.2 Contrast Immoral > Moral in Psychopathic Individuals
In addition to the analysis  of brain regions that are associated with moral > neutral 
conflicts in psychopaths, moral conflicts were investigated in more detail by a second 
analysis of the moral conflict condition. In this analysis, activity in the moral decision 
condition was subtracted from activity in the immoral decision condition. The aim of 
this analysis was to identify brain activity related to deciding personally-guided versus 
deciding morally-guided in an everyday moral conflict.
 The  contrast  immoral  >  moral  answers  was  calculated  with  eight  of  the  twelve 
psychopathic subjects who showed a response pattern of at least 30% immoral decisions 
in  the  moral  conflict  condition.  In  contrast  to  morally-guided  responses,  immoral 
responses induced significantly more activation in the medial frontal gyrus bilaterally 
and  in  the  cingulate  gyrus  bilaterally  (Brodmann  Areas  6/24)  (see  table  7).  The 
activation of this contrast is illustrated in figure 9.
Table  7.  Brain  areas  with significantly  increased  activation  in  psychopathic  individuals  in  the 
contrast immoral > moral. 8 psychopathic individuals, T = 4, voxel size: 2 x 2 x 2 mm
Region Brodmann 
Area (BA)
Center MNI 
coordinates in mm
      x            y          z
Z-score Voxels 
(n)
M_im > M_m
Medial Frontal Gyrus (L/R)
Cingulate Gyrus (L/R)
6/24 4  -28 60 3.62 861
Clusters with p (corrected ) < 0.05 are listed. x, y, z are coordinates according to MNI system.  L, left; R,  
right.
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Figure 9. A-D: This image depicts a sectional view of significant brain activity in the immoral > 
moral contrast in psychopaths at MNI coordiantes x = 4, y = -28 and z = 60. This figure shows brain 
areas  with significant  activation in  the immoral  condition when compared  to  the  moral  condition in 
psychopaths. The significant activated areas are shown in yellow color. A-C: Significant brain activation 
bilaterally in the medial frontal gyrus and cingulate gyrus. D: Glass brain showing significant activation 
in the aforementioned areas.
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4.2.3 Descriptive Comparison of the Imaging Data of Psychopathic 
Individuals and the Non-Psychopathic Criminal Control Group
A  comparison  of  activated  brain  areas  in  the  moral  >  neutral  contrast  between 
psychopaths  and non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  was only possible  on a 
descriptive  but  not  on  a  statistical  level  because  of  the  wide  range  of  given 
immoral/moral answers within the psychopathic group (moral answers: M = 15.92, SD 
= 6.79; immoral answers: M = 11.08, SD = 6.75).
On descriptive level, non-psychopathic criminal control subjects showed increased 
activation in the (middle) temporal lobe (BA 20/21) bilaterally. In contrast, psychopaths 
showed activation in the left middle temporal lobe, but not in the right. Furthermore, in 
the  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  group  brain  activation  was  revealed  in  the 
superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) and in the Cuneus area (BA 18), whereas in psychopaths 
there is no activation in these areas. On the other hand, criminal psychopaths showed 
activation in the orbitofrontal cortex bilaterally (BA 10/11), whereas non-psychopathic 
criminal control subjects activation was shown only in the medial and superior frontal 
gyrus (BA 9/10). Figure 10 illustrates the descriptive comparison between psychopaths 
and non-psychopathic criminal control subjects in the moral > neutral contrast.
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Figure 10. Descriptive comparison of brain areas with increased activation in psychopaths (green) 
compared  to  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  (red). Obvious  differences  between  the 
activations of the two groups can be seen in the right (middle) temporal lobe (BA 20/21) which shows 
high activation in the non-psychopathic control group whereas there is no activation in the psychopathic 
group. High activation in the non-psychopathic control group is furthermore in the superior frontal gyrus  
(BA 6) and in the Cuneus area (BA 18) which is lacking in the psychopathic group. Psychopaths show 
activation in the orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11), but criminal non-psychopaths do not.
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5 DISCUSSION
As  already  mentioned  in  the  theoretical  part  of  this  thesis,  moral  decision-making 
processes and the corresponding neural correlates in healthy individuals have become 
an active area of functional neuroimaging research. Several studies investigated simple 
moral judgments and moral dilemmas in order to reveal brain areas associated with 
moral decision-making. These studies showed that a variety of brain areas located in 
frontal, parietal, temporal and limbic cortices are involved in moral reasoning. Specific 
brain areas that are associated with increased activity in studies with moral decisions are 
the  medial  frontal  gyrus,  the  orbitofrontal  gyrus,  the  precuneus  and  the  posterior 
cingulate  cortex,  the  superior  temporal  sulcus  and  temporo-parietal  junction,  the 
temporal poles, and the amygdala (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll et 
al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b). Whereas many studies investigated 
moral  reasoning  processes  in  healthy  subjects,  moral  reasoning  in  psychopathic 
individuals is poorly understood. Most of the studies that investigated psychopaths in 
structural  and  functional  imaging  studies  concentrated  on  judgments  about  moral 
dilemmas and emotion processing.  These studies  revealed that  several  brain regions 
within  a  fronto-temporo-limbic  network  showed  deficient  activation  in  functional 
studies  or reduced volumes in  structural  studies.  Specific  brain regions  that  showed 
impaired activation in psychopathic individuals are the prefrontal cortex, especially the 
orbitofrontal cortex, the cingulate gyrus, and the superior temporal gyrus, as well as the 
amygdala (Glenn et al., 2009; Kiehl et al., 2001; Kiehl et al., 2004; Müller et al., 2003; 
Müller et al., 2008; Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Raine et al., 2000; Yang et al., 2005a; 
Yang et al., 2005b). But none of these studies used realistic everyday moral conflicts in 
order to reveal the neural correlates of decision-making in everyday situations. 
The  present  study  attempts  to  close  this  gap  by investigating  the  neural 
underpinnings  of  moral  decision-making  in  realistic  everyday  moral  conflicts  in 
psychopaths.  Therefore,  stories  describing  morally  relevant  or  neutral  (morally 
irrelevant) situations were presented to psychopathic individuals. In the moral conflicts 
condition, subjects had to choose between a morally-guided response and a personal 
desire-guided  (immoral)  response.  In  the  neutral  conflict  condition,  subjects  had  to 
choose between two conflicting personal desires. After the experiment in the scanner, 
67
Discussion
subjects had to indicate their emotion and certainty for each decision they made. The 
imaging and behavioral results from criminal psychopaths were compared to those from 
a non-psychopathic criminal control group in order to highlight differences between the 
two groups  and to  provide  higher  informative  value  about  the  interpretation  of  the 
results revealed in psychopaths.
Before discussing the results from this study in more detail, the main findings will 
briefly be summarized here. 
On behavioral level, there was a statistical tendency towards more immoral decisions 
in  the psychopathic  group when compared to  the non-psychopathic  criminal  control 
group  and  psychopaths  reported  significantly  higher  emotion  ratings  than  non-
psychopathic criminal control subjects when deciding immorally.
In order to identify brain regions involved in everyday moral decision-making in 
psychopaths, activity during conflict and question presentation in the neutral conflicts 
condition  was  subtracted  from  the  corresponding  activity  in  the  moral  conflicts 
condition. In psychopathic individuals, this contrast revealed activity in bilateral medial 
and superior frontal areas (BA 9/10/11), bilateral superior temporal and supramarginal 
gyrus (BA 39), left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), and the posterior cingulate and 
precuneus region (BA 7/31). These findings were compared on descriptive level to the 
brain areas that showed activation in the same contrast in non-psychopathic criminal 
control subjects. In this comparison, the orbitofrontal cortex (BA 11) showed activation 
in psychopaths but not in control subjects. No activation was found in psychopaths in 
the right middle temporal lobe (BA 20/21), the superior frontal gyrus (BA 6) and the 
cuneus area (BA 18) when compared to  non-psychopathic  criminal  control subjects.
In addition to the moral > neutral  contrast  and in order to identify brain activity 
related  to  choosing  immoral  responses  over  moral  responses,  the  moral  conflict 
condition was analyzed in more detail, and activity in the moral decision condition was 
subtracted from activity in the immoral decision condition.  In psychopaths, immoral 
responses  induced  more  activity  in  the  medial  frontal  gyrus  bilaterally  and  in  the 
cingulate gyrus bilaterally (BA 6/24) when compared to moral decisions.
The following discussion is divided into two main parts. In the first part, behavioral 
data  will  be  described  and  commented.  Functional  imaging  data  of  psychopathic 
individuals and non-psychopathic criminal control subjects is going to be described and 
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discussed in the second part. Finally, a short summary of the present discussion and a 
short outlook for future research is given.
5.1 Behavioral data
5.1.1 Behavioral Data from the fMRI Scanning Experiment of 
Psychopathic Individuals
During the fMRI scanning experiment, psychopathic individuals were presented with 
realistic  conflicts  that  contained  either  a  moral  or  a  neutral  conflict.  In  the  moral 
conflicts, the subject had to choose between a personal desire and a conflicting moral 
standard.  In  the  neutral  conflicts,  a  decision  between  two  morally  irrelevant  but 
conflicting personal desires was required. 
In  the  following  part,  two  interesting  results  of  the  statistical  analysis  of  the 
behavioral  data  during  the  scanning  experiment  are  going  to  be  discussed.  First, 
psychopaths chose the immoral decision within the moral conflicts in a relatively high 
number. The possible reasons for this result as well as the peculiarity of realistic moral 
conflicts as they were used in this study are going to be explained. And second, the fact 
that within the psychopathic group there was a wide span of given moral or immoral 
answers  questions  the  existence  of  the  prototypical  psychopath  and  emphasizes  the 
heterogeneity within a group of psychopathic individuals.   
In  order  to  explain  the  relatively  high  number  of  chosen  immoral  decisions  by 
psychopaths (average of 39.57% compared to an average of 56.86% of chosen moral 
answers) the differences between realistic moral conflicts as they were presented in the 
present study and moral dilemmas as used in previous functional imaging studies are 
going to be pointed out. 
The main characteristics of moral dilemmas are that, first, all possible choices have 
morally undesirable outcomes and second, moral dilemmas are not very realistic and not 
representable for everyday life conflicts. An example for a moral dilemma is the trolley 
dilemma where a runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be killed if the 
trolley proceeds on its present course. The two possible choices of this dilemma are: to 
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hit a switch that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one  
person instead of five or to let the trolley continue on its present course where it will kill 
five people  (Thomson, 1985). Both outcomes are morally undesirable as in each case 
people will die. Besides the undesirable outcomes, moral dilemmas are characterized by 
their lack of reality which makes them not reproducible for everyday moral situations.
In contrast to this are everyday moral conflicts as used in the present study. In these 
realistic conflicts, a choice is required between a hedonistic, personal desire-guided, but 
not illegal, decision on the one hand and the fulfillment of a moral obligation towards 
another person on the other hand. For example, when I run to the bus station to catch the 
waiting bus home, I see an old lady who stumbled and needs help. Would I fulfil my 
moral obligation towards the lady and help her to pick up her purchases? Even though I 
had a long working day and I would have to wait two more hours for my next bus  
home? Or would I fulfil my personal desire and take the bus home? Choosing the latter, 
immoral decision would lead to a personal advantage – in this case, getting the bus 
home instead of waiting two more hours after a long working day. But, fulfilling the 
personal desire may also result in self-reproach, shame and unpleasant emotions about 
the own egoistic behavior. But, the resulting disadvantage for another person, in this 
case the old lady, is not that serious compared to the outcomes of a moral dilemma. In a 
moral  conflict  nobody  will  get  into  a  life-threatening  situation  when  choosing  the 
immoral  decision.  As  a  consequence,  choosing  the  personal  desire-guided  decision 
would not have any legal consequences. Choosing the morally-guided decision instead, 
would be a fulfillment of the socially-desired and socially-required way of behaving. In 
this case, the personal desire would be inhibited in order to fulfill a moral obligation. 
The  personal  consequence  of  choosing  the  moral  decision  would  be  a  personal 
discomfort, for example waiting to more hours for the bus.
In contrast to moral dilemmas, realistic moral conflicts allow a supposition about the 
behavior of psychopaths in moral conflicts in real life. It seems that in the present study, 
psychopaths answered very frankly due to the certainty about not being punished neither 
in the study nor in real life for choosing an immoral option. Based on this more or less 
honest  behavior  of  the  psychopaths  in  the  present  study,  it  can  be  concluded  that 
psychopaths, in real life, would behave similar in case of experiencing such a moral 
conflict. Maybe the imagination of a psychopath as an individual fulfilling moral norms 
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and standards sounds a little bit strange. But an explanation for their “moral” behavior 
or decision-making could be that in most of the presented conflicts the moral option 
consisted in a short-time action or behavior  of the subject,  e.g.  to  take care for the 
neighbor's son for a few hours or to offer the seat in the train to an elderly lady. In none 
of these cases the psychopath needs to accept deeper interpersonal connections. He can 
keep up his superficial charm instead and maybe he can even increase his grandiose 
sense  of  self-worth.  Concluding,  it  can  be  said  that  whereas  psychopaths  are  often 
arrested  due  to  their  enormous  aggressive  potential  in  combination  with  emotional 
detachment  that  characterizes  their  offenses,  they  may  not  attract  any  attention  in 
everyday life in simple moral conflicting situations. Additionally, it has to be pointed 
out that it is difficult to make reliable statements about the behavior of psychopaths in 
real life as the moral conflicts presented in this study are constructed cases that lack a 
comparable match sample.
In addition to the way how psychopaths decide and behave in a moral conflict, the 
behavioral  data  analysis  of  the present  study provides  further  information about  the 
inhomogeneity  within  the  group  of  psychopaths.  Whereas  one  psychopathic  subject 
chose the personal desire-guided decision only once out of 28 conflicts, another subject 
chose the immoral decision 23 times out of 28. This represents the influence of each 
psychopathic individual and leads to a very inhomogeneous group of psychopaths. Of 
course, all of the participating psychopathic individuals scored high on the Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised but it has to be considered that not all of them reached high scores on 
both factors.  They all  had high scores on the antisocial  factor,  but on the affective-
interpersonal  factor  subsuming for example pathological lying,  lack of empathy and 
guilt or failure to accept responsibility, not all of the psychopathic subject reached high 
scores. Keeping in mind this differences within a group of psychopaths, the question for 
the prototypical psychopath gets some more aspects. Nevertheless, within a collective of 
psychopaths, the prototype of a psychopath fulfilling all characteristics and scoring on 
each criterion exists. But most of the patients diagnosed with psychopathy have to be 
investigated in more detail to find out their specific problems in order to adapt further 
therapy procedures to their grade of emotional detachment and to their affective and 
interpersonal  ability for cooperation,  and not  only to their  aggressive and impulsive 
behavior.
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In sum, the moral conflicts presented in the present study were suitable for detecting 
the decisions of psychopathic individuals in the study and allowed to make assumptions 
for the behavior of psychopaths in everyday life. Furthermore, the behavioral results 
emphasize the individuality of each human being – of a non-psychopathic individual as 
well as of a psychopath.     
5.1.2 Behavioral Data from the fMRI Scanning Experiment Compared 
between Psychopathic Individuals and Non-Psychopathic 
Criminal Control Subjects
In  order  to  reveal  differences  between  psychopaths  and  non-psychopathic  criminal 
control  subjects,  the  behavioral  data  of  both  groups  acquired  during  the  scanning 
experiment was statistically compared. In the psychopathic group, a statistical tendency 
to more immoral and personal desire-guided decisions was revealed when compared to 
the non-psychopathic criminal control subjects.
In  the following, the meaning of this result is going to be discussed. Therefore, it is 
helpful  to  define  the  characteristics  of  psychopaths  on  the  one  hand  and  of  non-
psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  on  the  other  hand.  An  individual  that  is 
diagnosed with psychopathy reaches a high score on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised 
(PCL-R).  The  score  consists  of  two  factors:  one  factor  that  subsumes  affective-
interpersonal personality traits such as pathological lying, lack of remorse or empathy 
and superficial charm and a second factor that includes items describing an antisocial, 
impulsive and delinquent personality. The non-psychopathic criminal control subjects 
tested in this study differ from psychopaths in their lower total scoring that is mainly 
due  to  a  very  low  score  on  the  affective-interpersonal  factor.  So,  whereas  both, 
psychopaths and non-psychopathic criminal control subjects are characterized by their 
high  grade  of  aggressive  and antisocial  behavior,  only psychopaths  are  additionally 
defined as affected on emotional level. 
As a conclusion from the just mentioned differences between psychopaths and non-
psychopathic criminal control subjects, the tendency to choose more immoral answers 
revealed in psychopaths can be explained by an impairment of affective and emotional 
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behavior in psychopaths compared to the non-psychopathic criminal control subjects. 
Considering  this  aspect  from the  point  of  view that  for  intact  moral  reasoning and 
decision-making both emotion and reasoning are important, the tendency for immoral 
behavior  in  psychopaths  could  be  a  consequence  from  an  impaired  emotional 
mechanism in their moral reasoning processing. 
5.1.3 Post-Scanning Questionnaire Data of Psychopathic Individuals
In order to provide further information about the emotions and the certainty that were 
experienced by the psychopathic subjects when deciding in a moral conflict, a further 
analysis  of  the  moral  conflicts  showed  that  in  contrast  to  morally-guided  behavior, 
personal  desire-guided  immoral  behavior  was  associated  with  significantly  lower 
certainty and emotion ratings. This means that psychopaths when choosing a morally-
guided decision  felt  better  and more  certain  than  when choosing a  personal  desire-
guided  decision.  But  can  it  therefore  be  concluded  that  psychopaths,  who  are 
characterized by an emotional deficient behavior,  experience unpleasant emotions or 
even some kind of “bad conscience” when deciding immorally? Of course, this is not 
impossible. In spite of the characteristic features such as lack of guilt  and empathy,  
shallow affect and pathological lying, the psychopath is still a human being equipped 
with  human  qualities.  In  addition,  psychopaths  are,  as  already  mentioned,  a  very 
inhomogeneous group and therefore it is not totally unthinkable that within this group 
some  individuals  may  really  experience  unpleasant  emotions  in  terms  of a  bad 
conscience. 
But, an explanation that seems to be more possible and true than a more or less intact 
bad conscience in psychopaths, is that when choosing an immoral decision, psychopaths 
know that this decision is socially not desired. Therefore their emotions concerning this 
decision are lower and they feel more uncertain about this decision. But finally, they do 
not care about these emotions and the uncertainty and decide the way they would have 
decided anyways,  without  respecting social  norms and knowing that  they chose the 
“bad” alternative of the decision. Therefore, it can be concluded that psychopaths know 
what is socially desired and what is against social standards, but they simply do not care 
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about such knowledge and the consequences that ensue from their immoral behavior. 
Thus, their resulting behavior may also be characterized by the influence of unpleasant 
emotions.
5.1.4 Post-Scanning  Questionnaire  Data  Comparison  between 
Psychopathic  Individuals  and  Non-Psychopathic  Criminal 
Control Subjects
The post-scanning questionnaire data of psychopaths was statistically compared to the 
data of non-psychopathic criminal control subjects in order to point out differences on 
behavioral level between the two groups. For this comparison it was hypothesized that 
psychopaths would indicate higher emotion and certainty ratings (better feelings and 
more  certainty)  when  deciding  immorally  compared  to  non-psychopathic  criminal 
control  subjects.  In  the  moral  condition,  higher  emotion  ratings  were  revealed  in 
psychopaths compared to criminal non-psychopaths when choosing the moral decision 
and when choosing the personal desire-guided immoral option. For the certainty ratings, 
the hypothesis was not confirmed as no significant differences were revealed.
In the following part,  the results of this comparison between the two groups and 
especially their meaning for the behavior of psychopaths are going to be interpreted and 
discussed briefly. The interesting outcome of this statistical analysis is that psychopaths 
did not  feel  as  emotionally affected as the non-psychopathic  criminal  control  group 
when choosing an immoral decision. So, the main behavioral difference between the 
two  groups  which  is  the  emotional  detachment  of  the  psychopathic  group,  is  also 
reflected in this result that indicates the relatively lower involvement of emotions in the 
decision-making process in psychopaths. 
In addition to the aforementioned hypothesis that psychopaths know the differences 
between  socially  desired  and  non-desired  behaviors  in  moral  conflicts,  it  can  be 
concluded that psychopaths do not care about their immoral or moral decision-making 
as they are emotionally impaired and do not feel unpleasant emotions or rather they are 
not inhibited in their immoral decision-making process by a “bad conscience”. 
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5.2 Functional Imaging Data
5.2.1 Contrast Moral > Neutral in Criminal Psychopathic Individuals
In order to investigate the neural underpinnings of everyday moral decision-making in 
psychopaths, 12 psychopathic individuals were presented with realistic moral conflicts 
with either moral or neutral content. In the moral conflicts condition, subjects had to 
decide  between  a  morally-guided  response  and  a  personal  desire-guided  immoral 
response.  The  activity  in  the  neutral  conflicts  condition  was  subtracted  from  the 
corresponding activity in the moral conflicts condition in order to identify brain areas 
associated with everyday moral reasoning in psychopaths.
For this contrast, it was hypothesized that realistic everyday moral conflicts would 
evoke  activity  in  brain  areas  that  are  known  to  show  activation  in  simple  moral 
judgment or moral dilemma tasks. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that psychopaths 
would show a similar pattern of activation as healthy individuals when processing moral 
decision-making  tasks.  Previous  studies  investigated  judgments  about  simple  moral 
claims or moral dilemmas in healthy individuals and revealed brain areas such as the 
medial and orbitofrontal gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus (TPJ), the precuneus and 
the cingulate cortex region (Greene et al.,  2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 
2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b).  
In  the  present  study,  activity  in  the  moral  >  neutral  contrast  in  psychopathic 
individuals was revealed in bilateral medial and superior frontal areas (BA 9/10/11), 
bilateral superior temporal and supramarginal gyrus (BA 39/40), left middle temporal 
gyrus (BA 21), and the posterior cingulate and precuneus region BA 7/31). All of these 
regions  have  been  known  to  be  involved  in  moral  reasoning  processes  in  healthy 
individuals. Thus, the above mentioned hypotheses for this study were confirmed. First, 
realistic  everyday moral  conflicts  stimulated  brain  regions  that  are  known to  show 
activation in simple moral judgment or moral dilemma tasks. In addition, psychopaths 
showed a similar pattern of brain activation when judging everyday moral conflicts as 
healthy individuals when judging moral claims or moral dilemmas.
Before discussing the meaning of the imaging findings in the moral > neutral contrast 
in psychopaths revealed in the present study, the difference between realistic everyday 
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moral conflicts used in this study and moral dilemmas used in previous studies on moral 
reasoning is going to be summarized briefly. 
The main characteristics of moral dilemmas are that, first, all possible choices have 
morally undesirable outcomes and second, moral dilemmas are  not realistic and not 
representable for everyday life conflicts. In contrast to this are everyday moral conflicts 
as used in the present study. In these realistic conflicts, a choice is required between a 
hedonistic,  personal  desire-guided,  but  not  illegal  decision on the one hand and the 
fulfillment of a moral obligation towards another person on the other hand. The moral 
conflicts used in the present study are all very realistic and concrete.
So, it  can be concluded that whereas everyday moral  conflicts  differ from moral 
dilemmas in their (personal and legal) consequences and outcomes, they evoke activity 
in the same brain areas that are known to show activation in moral dilemma tasks. This 
result was already obtained in a study that tested 12 healthy individuals with the same 
paradigm as used in the present study (Sommer et al., 2010). In the moral conflicts > 
neutral conflicts comparison, an activation of medial prefrontal cortex (BA 8, 9, 10, 11),  
bilateral temporo-parietal junction (BA 39, 40), bilateral middle and superior temporal 
cortex (BA 21, 22), posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23, 31), bilateral thalamus and right 
inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45) was shown in healthy individuals. Based on the obtained 
findings, the authors concluded that cortical brain areas associated with moral cognition 
are not only involved in and stimulated by reasoning about unrealistic moral dilemmas 
(as  described  above)  but  also  in  realistic  moral  decisions  on  everyday  conflicting 
situations (Sommer et al., 2010).
By  the  findings  of  the  present  study,  the  conclusion  drawn  by  Sommer  and 
colleagues concerning healthy individuals can be expanded to psychopathic individuals. 
So,  generally  and  at  first  view,  brain  activation  evoked by realistic  moral  conflicts 
seems to be similar in psychopaths and in healthy individuals. But does this implicate 
that  psychopaths do not  differ  from healthy individuals  in  their  neural  correlates of 
moral decision-making? And further, can therefore be concluded that psychopaths are 
not impaired in moral reasoning? Or is it due to other influences and reasons such as 
impaired  emotional  detachment,  differences  on  behavioral  level  or  disturbed 
connectivity  of  neural  circuits  that  psychopaths  show  a  similar  pattern  of  brain 
activation  to  healthy  individuals  when  processing  moral  conflicts  but  differ  from 
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healthy individuals in their immoral, antisocial and emotionless behavior? 
In order to find an answer to these questions and to analyze the meaning of the 
imaging  findings  obtained  in  the  moral  >  neutral  contrast  in  psychopaths,  in  the 
following  part  all  obtained  brain areas  are  going  to  be  discussed  related  to  their 
functions in moral reasoning, social interacting and emotional decision-making as well 
as relating to their involvement in psychopathy.
5.2.1.1 Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
In the moral conflicts condition compared to the neutral conflicts condition, significant 
activity was shown in bilateral medial frontal gyrus and bilateral superior frontal gyrus. 
These frontal lobe areas correspond to the Brodmann Areas 9/10 and 11 and can be 
divided by their localization and functions into the medial frontal gyrus (BA 9/10) and 
the  orbitofrontal  cortex  (OFC,  BA 11).  The  important  role  of  these  areas  in  moral 
reasoning  was  already  pointed  out  by  previous  lesion  and  neuroimaging  studies 
(Damasio et al., 1994; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Greene, 2007).
In order to interpret the obtained frontal activations in psychopaths in the moral > 
neutral contrast, first, the findings of previous studies that concentrated on the functions 
of  the  OFC  and  the  medial  frontal  gyrus  in  healthy  individuals  are  going  to  be 
summarized.  Then,  studies  that  showed an  involvement  of  OFC and  medial  frontal 
gyrus in psychopathy are going to be delineated.  
In several fMRI studies, Moll and colleagues (2001; 2002a; 2002b) found significant 
activations in the frontopolar cortex and the medial frontal cortex in healthy subjects in 
a moral judgment task, as well as a medial orbitofrontal/medial frontal gyrus activation 
when healthy subjects  were presented  with moral  pictures.  Furthermore,  they found 
orbitofrontal  cortex (OFC) activation in association with negative emotions in moral 
judgments  (Moll  et  al.,  2001;  2002a;  2002b).  Additionally,  a  strong interconnection 
between the medial OFC and the superior temporal sulcus, the precuneus and the medial 
frontal gyrus was revealed in healthy individuals in a moral condition when compared 
to  an unpleasant  condition (Moll  et  al.,  2002a).  Greene and colleagues  (2001),  too, 
found medial frontal gyrus (BA 9 and 10) activation in healthy individuals in a moral-
personal condition (dilemma) compared to non-moral conditions (Greene et al., 2001). 
77
Discussion
So,  all  of  these  studies  found  OFC  and  medial  frontal  gyrus  activation  in  moral 
reasoning-associated tasks. A more general function of the medial prefrontal cortex was 
revealed  by Grabenhorst  et  al.  (2008) who found medial  prefrontal  cortex  (BA 10) 
activation  in  binary  decision-making  (Grabenhorst  et  al.,  2008).  In  sum,  the 
involvement of the medial frontal gyrus and the OFC in processes that require moral 
reasoning and decision-making is already replicated by several neuroimaging studies. In 
line with these findings, the present results support OFC (BA 11) and medial/superior 
frontal cortex (BA 9/10) activation in a moral conflict judgment task. But, in contrast to 
the previous studies that investigated either simple moral judgments or moral dilemmas, 
the present study used realistic everyday moral conflicts for the moral decision-making 
task. Regarding this point, the activation revealed in the above mentioned frontal areas 
expand previous findings by showing that the OFC and medial frontal gyrus are not 
only involved in reasoning about abstract moral dilemmas but also in conflicts about 
realistic moral situations. 
Though, it has to be considered that the discussed frontal brain regions are not only 
known to be involved directly in moral reasoning processes but they are also associated 
with processes and functions that are relevant for decision-making processes in general 
and for moral reasoning processes in particular. For example, the medial frontal gyrus 
was shown to be involved in integrating emotions into decision-making and planning 
(Partiot et al., 1995) as well as in theory of mind (Castelli et al., 2000; Gallagher et al., 
2000). Moreover, Amodio and Frith (2006) emphasize the role of the medial frontal 
cortex in social cognitive processes that include, for example, self-reflection and person 
perception (Amodio & Frith, 2006). An additional function of the OFC is its key role in 
emotional  processes.  In  an  fMRI  study,  Farrow  et  al.  (2001)  tested  the  functional 
anatomical  bases  of  empathy  and  forgiveness  in  healthy  subjects  and  showed 
orbitofrontal gyrus (BA 11) and superior frontal gyrus (BA 9) activation in empathic and 
forgivability judgments (Farrow et al., 2001). 
For further attribution of functions, it  is important to keep in mind the functional 
divisions within the medial frontal cortex. Therefore it is helpful to distinguish between 
the  medial  frontal  gyrus  (around  BA 9/10)  and  the  orbitofrontal  areas  (BA 10/11) 
(Amodio, 2006). Even the different connectivities of these areas, which are known from 
studies in monkeys, should be taken into consideration. In general, the majority and the 
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strongest projections of the medial frontal cortex are intrinsic ones or are projections to 
adjacent prefrontal areas (Barbas et al., 1999). An important connection exists between 
the OFC and the medial prefrontal cortex region and the amygdala (Carmichael & Price, 
1995; Cavada et al.,  2000). The superior part of the medial frontal cortex (BA 9) is 
connected to the lateral premotor cortex, the supplementary motor area (SMA) and the 
cingulate motor area (Barbas et al., 1999). The medial OFC receives afferents from the 
dorsolateral  prefrontal  cortex,  the  temporal  pole,  the  superior  temporal  gyrus,  the 
parietotemporal cortex and the posterior cingulate cortex, whereas the lateral OFC is 
strongly connected to sensory-related areas (Barbas et al., 1999; Carmichael & Price, 
1996; Cavada et al., 2000). The division into medial and lateral OFC is not only due to 
its different connectivities but also to the different functions. O'Doherty et al. (2001) 
tested  OFC involvement  in  an  fMRI  reversal-learning  task  and  found  medial  OFC 
activation following a rewarding outcome, whereas lateral OFC activated following a 
punishing outcome  (O'Doherty et al., 2001). So, the OFC is supposed to be crucially 
involved in the evaluation and monitoring of the possible future outcome of a behavior 
(Walton et al., 2004).
In sum,  functions  that  can  be attributed  to  the  OFC and medial  frontal  gyrus  in 
healthy individuals extend from general involvement in moral decision-making to the 
integration of emotion into moral reasoning and to other social and emotional processes 
such as self-reflection,  forgivability and empathy.  Another important  function of the 
OFC in  particular  is  the  evaluation  of  possible  future  outcomes  of  a  decision  or  a 
behavior.  All  these  abilities  and functions  are  associated  with OFC /  medial  frontal 
gyrus activation in healthy individuals. But what is the role of these frontal brain areas 
in psychopathic individuals? Several studies investigated this point. The main findings 
are going to be summarized in the following part.
The involvement  of  OFC in emotion and decision-making processes was already 
pointed  out  for  healthy  individuals.  The  role  of  these  areas  in  psychopaths  can  be 
explained based on OFC and prefrontal cortex lesion studies. As already mentioned, the 
railway foreman Phineas Gage experienced severe personality change after an acquired 
prefrontal cortex brain lesion (Brodmann Areas 11, 12, 8-10) which resulted in impaired 
social  behavior,  lack  of  responsibility  and  compromised  emotion  processing  and 
decision-making in spite of largely preserved intellectual abilities and working memory 
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(Damasio et al., 1994). Other studies that investigated prefrontal cortex lesion patients 
emphasize its involvement in emotion, social and moral behavior and decision-making 
(Anderson et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 1996; Bechara et al., 2000; Damasio et al., 1994; 
Hornak et al., 2003). 
Due to the fact that psychopathic individuals are characterized by an impairment of 
exactly  these  features  (emotional  detachment,  deficient  social  and  moral  behavior) 
(Hare  et  al.,  1991),  a  prefrontal  cortex  dysfunction  or  lesion  in  psychopaths  was 
suggested  and  is  supported  by  several  study  results.  Kiehl  and  colleagues  (2001) 
revealed significantly  reduced affect-related activation in the rostral anterior cingulate 
cortex/medial  OFC  in  criminal  psychopaths  (Kiehl  et  al.,  2001).  Reduced  OFC 
activation  in  psychopaths  was  also  shown  during  an  aversive  conditioning  task 
(Birbaumer  et  al.,  2005).  In  addition  to  functional  impairment  of  the  OFC  in 
psychopaths, several studies revealed structural volume reduction in this area (Müller et 
al., 2008; Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Raine et al., 2000). For example, Oliveira-Souza 
et al. (2008) used voxel-based morphometry and revealed gray matter reduction in the 
OFC in psychopaths (Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008). 
In  sum,  not  only lesion  studies  but  also  functional  and  structural  brain  imaging 
studies revealed an impairment of OFC and medial frontal cortex in psychopaths. So, 
how can the obtained activations of these brain areas in psychopaths be explained in this 
study? 
First and as already mentioned above, the OFC and medial frontal gyrus are brain 
regions  typically  involved in  moral  reasoning in  healthy individuals  (Greene  et  al., 
2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2001; 2002a; 2002b). In this study, a decision 
between a morally-guided response and a personal desire-guided response or between 
two conflicting personal desires was required. In each case, the subject had to choose 
one out of two presented options and therefore, a moral decision-making process was 
inevitably induced. Whereas previous studies showed an impairment of OFC and medial 
frontal  gyrus  in  psychopaths  especially  in  affect-related  tasks  (Kiehl  et  al.,  2001; 
Birbaumer et al., 2005), it seems that in the present study, the moral decision-making 
process itself evoked an activation of these areas. This means that frontal brain regions 
that are typically involved in moral decision-making processes in healthy individuals, 
show activation in a moral conflict decision-making situation in psychopaths.
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It has to be considered, that the simple activation of the OFC and medial frontal 
gyrus  in  a  realistic  moral  conflicts  does  not  allow to  draw a  conclusion  about  the 
intactness  of  emotion  processing  in  the  decision-making  process  in  psychopaths. 
Possibly, the evaluation of the possible future outcomes of the decisions plays a role in 
the OFC activation in moral conflicts in psychopaths. Whereas the decision for one of 
the two conflicting personal desire options in the neutral conflict has relatively little 
emotional  consequences,  the moral  conflict  situation leads  to  different  outcomes.  In 
case of choosing a moral decision, the subject evaluates the positive feelings associated 
with helping compared to the resulting personal disadvantages. And in the case that the 
person decides to fulfill the personal desire, the feelings about the personal advantage 
compensate possible negative feelings such as shame. So, in line with previous findings 
(O'Doherty et al., 2001; Walton et al., 2004) the OFC activation could be explained by a 
strong evaluative process of the possible outcomes and their consequences. Keeping in 
mind  the  findings  by O'Doherty et  al.  (2001)  who revealed  medial  OFC activation 
following a rewarding outcome in an fMRI reversal-learning task in healthy individuals, 
it could be concluded that especially the evaluation of a rewarding outcome evokes an 
activation of the OFC in psychopaths. The rewarding outcome may be the fulfillment of 
a personal desire on the one hand, or a socially-desired behavior that may result  in 
social reward on the other hand . In conclusion, the obtained activation in medial frontal 
brain  areas  in  psychopaths,  especially  in  the  OFC,  can  be  explained  by the  moral 
decision-making  process  and  the  evaluation  of  the  future,  especially  rewarding 
outcomes of the chosen decision.
But what is the explanation for the obtained OFC activation in psychopaths in this 
study  considering  that  psychopaths  are  characterized  by  emotional  and  social 
deficiency,  features  that  were  related  to  OFC  lesions  or  functional  impairment  in 
previous studies (Damasio et al., 1994; Hare et al., 1991; Kiehl et al., 2001)? There are 
several aspects that should be considered. First, a compensatory mechanism within the 
OFC could be discussed. And second, the connectivity of the OFC with other brain 
areas, especially with the amygdala (Carmichael & Price, 1995; Cavada et al., 2000) has 
to be considered. In the following, the mentioned aspects are going to be explained and 
discussed. 
First, the activation of the OFC in moral conflicting situations in psychopaths in the 
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present study could be explained by a compensatory mechanism within the OFC. As 
mentioned above, it seems that in the moral condition the OFC activation is strongly 
influenced by the evaluation of the future outcome in the decision-making process. In 
healthy subjects, the OFC is furthermore involved in emotional and social processes 
such as empathy, self-reflection and person perception (Amodio, 2006; Farrow et al., 
2001). Possibly, psychopaths who lack social functions such as empathy, can have a 
deficient  affect-related  OFC  function  (Kiehl  et  al.,  2001),  but  a  strong  evaluative 
function of the OFC that compensates the deficient affect-related activation and leads to 
the obtained OFC activation in the moral condition.
Another aspect that could explain the obtained OFC activation in emotional deficient 
psychopaths  concerns  the  connectivity  between  OFC  and  other  brain  areas.  As 
mentioned above, the OFC is strongly interconnected with the amygdala and the medial 
part of the OFC receives afferents from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the temporal 
pole, the superior temporal gyrus, the parietotemporal cortex and the posterior cingulate 
cortex (Barbas et al., 1999; Carmichael & Price, 1996; Cavada et al., 2000). Several 
authors investigated and discussed an insufficient amygdala function or deficient inputs 
from the amygdala to the OFC (Blair,  2007b; Kiehl,  2006; Kiehl et al.,  2001). This 
explains, on the one hand, the OFC impairment revealed in previous studies (Kiehl et 
al., 2001) and on the other hand, the disturbed affective behavior in psychopaths as the 
amygdala  is  known  to  be  crucially  involved  in  the  processing  of  affective  stimuli 
(Adolphs,  2008;  Sommer  et  al.,  2008).  In  the  present  study,  in  the moral  >  neutral 
condition,  no  amygdala  activation  was  shown  in  psychopaths.  This  supports  the 
assumption that the amygdala might be deficient in psychopaths and that therefore the 
OFC receives reduced inputs from the amygdala (Blair 2007b; Kiehl, 2006; Kiehl et al., 
2001). Reduced inputs from the amygdala would further explain general characteristics 
of  psychopaths  such  as  emotional  detachment.  Keeping  in  mind  that  the  amygdala 
region is also involved in neural circuits that underly unpleasant emotions (Lane et al., 
1997; Phan et al., 2002), it could be possible that psychopaths with a deficient amygdala 
function lack those unpleasant emotions. Colloquially it could be said that psychopaths 
lack “bad conscience”.  This  would extend the  findings  by Sommer  et  al.  (2010) in 
healthy  individuals  to  psychopaths  (Sommer  et  al.,  2010).  They revealed  amygdala 
activations when subjects chose the personal desire-guided response when compared to 
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the morally-guided responses. Therefore, the authors concluded that the activation in the 
amygdala region indicates the subject's unpleasant emotions about the immoral decision 
(Sommer et al., 2010). In psychopaths, it seems that there are no unpleasant emotions 
that could control behavior and decision-making. So, the role of a deficient amygdala 
region and reduced inputs from the amygdala to the OFC seems to be a mechanism that 
explains in part the emotional detachment of psychopaths. As for the OFC activation, it 
could be assumed that the OFC with afferents from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
the  temporal  pole,  the  superior  temporal  gyrus,  the  parietotemporal  cortex  and  the 
posterior cingulate cortex (Barbas et al., 1999; Carmichael & Price, 1996; Cavada et al., 
2000) compensates the reduced amygdala inputs. 
In sum, the OFC seems to receive reduced inputs from functional deficient amygdala 
regions. This may lead to impaired emotional behavior in psychopaths with a lack of 
unpleasant emotions and “bad conscience”. The OFC activation in the present study can 
therefore be explained by a compensatory input from other brain regions and by other 
OFC  functions  that  are  involved  in  moral  decision-making  processes  such  as  the 
evaluation of the possible outcomes. Additionally, the activation of the OFC and medial 
frontal gyrus extend the findings of previous studies on moral reasoning from healthy 
individuals to psychopaths and indicate that these areas are not only associated with 
decision-making in abstract moral dilemmas but also with decision-making in realistic 
everyday moral conflicts.
5.2.1.2 Temporal Cortex and Temporo-Parietal Junction
Additional  brain  areas  that  showed  activation  in  the  moral  >  neutral  contrast  in 
psychopaths  are  the  superior  temporal  gyrus  and  the  supramarginal  gyrus,  both 
bilaterally, corresponding to Brodmann Areas 39 and 40. Moreover, on the left side, 
activation  of  the  middle  temporal  gyrus  (Brodmann  Area  21)  was  revealed.  In  the 
following part,  functions that are associated to Brodmann Areas 39 and 40 and their 
relevance for moral decision-making are going to be described. Then the role of these 
brain  region  in  psychopathy  and  especially  in  the  present  study  are  going  to  be 
discussed. Finally, the meaning of left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) activation in this 
study  will be discussed.
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Several  neuroimaging  studies  showed  superior  temporal  sulcus  (STS)  activation 
when healthy individuals were presented with moral judgment tasks or moral emotional 
pictures (Moll et al., 2002a; 2002b). Besides STS involvement in moral reasoning, the 
STS  is  associated  with  social  perception,  facial  emotion  recognition,  and  the 
representation of intentional actions as well as imitation, imitation learning and action 
understanding (Allison et al., 2000; Narumoto et al., 2001;Rizzalotti & Craighero, 2004; 
Saxe et al., 2004). Beyond, the STS region plays an important role in forgiveness and 
empathy processing (Carr et al., 2003; Farrow et al., 2001; Leslie et al., 2004). In the 
present study, psychopathic subject were presented with conflicting moral and neutral 
stories and were asked to choose either a personal desire-guided or a morally-guided 
response in the moral conflict condition or one of two conflicting personal desires in the 
neutral  condition.  In  the  moral  conflicts,  processing  of  action  understanding,  social 
perception and empathy is more involved than in neutral conflicts. For example, the 
neutral  conflict  to  choose  between  pizza  or  pasta  in  a  restaurant  does  not  require 
empathy processing. In a moral conflict, such as helping the old lady to pick up her 
purchases or taking the waiting bus home after a long working day, the  subject may 
process social perception and empathic associations on neural level that result in the 
obtained bilateral STS activation. 
Furthermore,  the  temporal  cortex  plays  a  role  in  processing  sentence  and  text 
materials  and  in  encoding  semantic  material  into  the  working  memory  (Cabeza  & 
Nyberg, 2000; Hickok & Poeppel, 2004). As the moral conflicts require more personal 
identification and attention with the conflicting situation than the neutral conflicts, the 
increased activation of the temporal cortex in moral conflicts may be associated with 
increased information and text processing in working memory. 
The  activation  of  the  bordering  area  of  the  posterior  STS,  the  temporo-parietal 
junction (TPJ), suggests a high cognitive involvement in moral conflicts. The TPJ is 
involved in Theory of Mind (ToM), a term which is used to refer to any reasoning about 
another person's representational mental state. ToM is a human ability that allows to 
attribute mental states to other persons (Saxe et al., 2003). A number of studies (Fletcher 
et al., 1995; Gallagher et al., 2000; Sommer et al., 2007; Vogeley et al.,  2001) have 
reported increased activity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) when healthy subjects 
read verbal stories or see pictorial cartoons that require inferences about a character's 
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(false) beliefs. In  a  moral  conflict  as  used in  the  present  study,  the  TPJ is  probably 
involved in attributing mental states to other persons that appear in the conflict, such as 
the old lady. The TPJ activation may represent the ability to take the perspective of the 
other  person.  The  TPJ  is  known to  be  associated  with  moral  reasoning  in  healthy 
individuals, as TPJ activation was shown in several studies that used personal moral 
dilemmas, simple moral judgments or moral pictures (Greene et al., 2001; Moll et al., 
2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b). The findings of the present study extend 
previous  findings  on  moral  reasoning  to  TPJ  activation  in  realistic  everyday moral 
conflicts in psychopaths.
In sum, the TPJ and STS activation in moral conflicts in psychopaths may represent 
increased information and text processing and a higher involvement of social perception 
in moral conflicts than in neutral conflicts. But of course, the TPJ activation does not 
allow any conclusion on the intactness of ToM in psychopaths.  
It was suggested that in psychopaths, who exhibit deficits in abilities such as social 
perception  and  cognition  that  are  related  to  ToM,  the  ToM  mechanism  might  be 
deficient and therefore they develop antisocial behavior and emotional deficiency (Blair,
1995). Several authors supported this idea by their  study results. Kiehl et al.  (2004) 
found decreased activation in the right superior temporal gyrus in criminal psychopaths 
when differentiating between abstract and concrete stimuli (Kiehl et al., 2004). A loss of 
gray  matter  in  a  Voxel-based  morphometry  (VBM)  study  by  Müller  et  al.  (2008) 
revealed significantly gray matter volume loss in the superior temporal gyrus bilaterally 
and  Oliveira-Souza  et  al.  (2008)  repeated  these  findings  and  found  gray  matter 
reductions in the STS region in VBM. Furthermore, several studies suggested that an 
impaired ToM might lead to antisocial and aggressive behavior and psychopathy (Crick 
& Dodge,  1994;  Feshbach,  1987).  Whereas  Blair  and  colleagues  did  not  find  ToM 
impairment in psychopaths (Blair et al., 1996), Widom did (Widom, 1976). Richell and 
colleagues (2003) tested psychopathic individuals and a non-psychopathic control group 
with the 'Reading the Mind in the Eyes'  test  in which participants only see the eye 
region of individuals in a photograph. From this information alone they have to attribute 
a mental state to the person in the photograph. But, psychopathic individuals performed 
equally  well  on  the  test  as  the  non-psychopathic  control  group  and  Richell  and 
colleagues  draw the  conclusion  that  psychopaths  do  not  present  with  a  generalized 
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impairment on ToM (Richell et al., 2003). 
In conclusion and in line with previous studies on ToM in psychopaths, the bilateral 
TPJ activation in this study supports the theory of an involvement of a ToM-related 
brain  region  in  moral  decision-making  in  psychopaths.  Taken  together,  the  present 
findings  of  bilateral  TPJ  and  STS  activation  in  the  moral  conflict  condition  in 
psychopaths represent the involvement of a brain region that is associated with moral 
reasoning,  ToM,  social  perception  and  working  memory.  All  of  these  abilities  are 
relevant for moral judgment in realistic moral conflicts. 
In addition to bilateral TPJ activation, left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) activation 
was revealed in the moral > neutral contrast in psychopaths. This is an interesting fact 
given  that  the  right  hemisphere  is  dominant  in  emotional  processing  (Leslie  et  al.,
2004). So, what is the reason for the absent right-sided middle temporal gyrus activation 
in criminal psychopaths in moral decision-making? Could it be due to a deficiency in 
these areas in the right hemisphere in psychopaths? Several studies investigated right 
hemisphere  involvement  in  emotion  processing  and  in  psychopathy.  For  example, 
patients with damage to the right hemisphere are not able to recognize several basic 
emotional  expressions  (Adolphs et  al.,  1996;  Kucharska-Pietura et  al.,  2003).  Study 
results emphasize a right-sided temporal volume loss in psychopaths and in early onset 
conduct disorder (Kruesi et al., 2004; Müller et al., 2008). Müller et al. (2008) draw the 
conclusion that the right temporal cortex plays a critical role in psychopathy (Müller et
al., 2008). 
In line with these previous findings, the present results could indicate a right-sided 
temporal  lobe abnormality that  contributes to the pathogenesis of psychopathy.  This 
would support the theory of a deficiency in emotion processing in psychopaths that was 
already proposed by several authors (Kiehl, 2006; Müller et al., 2003).
5.2.1.3 Parietal Lobe
Additional to OFC, STS, TPJ and left middle temporal gyrus activation, another broad 
cluster  of  activation  was  revealed in  the  parietal  lobe:  the  posterior  cingulate  and 
cingulate  gyrus  (around  Brodmann  Area  31)  and  the  neighboring  precuneus  area 
(Brodmann Area 7) showed activation in the moral > neutral contrast in psychopaths. 
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These areas are known to be involved in moral reasoning as several previous studies 
revealed  increased  activation  in  different  moral  tasks  with  personal  and impersonal 
moral judgment  (Greene et al., 2001), viewing moral pictures  (Moll et al., 2002a) or 
viewing ToM cartoons (Gallagher et al., 2000) in healthy individuals.  
In the following part, the functions of the precuneus area and then of the posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) are going to be described. Their role in psychopathy and their 
contribution to the present study results are going to be discussed.  
Concerning  the  precuneus  (BA  7),  Cavanna  et  al.  (2006)  reviewed  the  most 
important functions and stated that visuo-spatial imagery and consciousness as well as 
episodic  memory retrieval  and self-processing  are  behavioral  correlates  of  this  area 
(Cavanna & Trimble, 2006). This data partly consists of results of a study by Fletcher et 
al.  (1995)  who  describe  the  precuneus  as  “The  Mind’s  Eye”  because  of  its  high 
activation  during  remembering  “imageable  versus  nonimageable  paired  associates”. 
Therefore  they  emphasize  the  role  of  this  parietal  area  in  memory  experiments, 
especially in episodic memory (Fletcher et al., 1995). As the present study required an 
intact working memory for processing the conflicts,  the activation of an area that is 
known to be active during memory tasks and episodic memory (kind of memory that 
refers  to  autobiographical,  personal  experiences  of  an  individual  (Tulving,  1983) is 
obvious. The obtained precuneus activation may represent an increased involvement of 
episodic memory when subjects processed moral conflicts compared to neutral conflicts 
as  the decision in a moral conflict requires more personal experiences than decision-
making in neutral conflicts.
Though, the precuneus also seems to play a crucial role in social cognition. Farrow et 
al. (2001) investigated neural correlates of empathy and forgiveness in healthy subjects 
in  an  fMRI  study  and  revealed  significant  precuneus  activation  during  judgments 
requiring  empathy and  forgiveability  (Farrow et  al.,  2001).  Furthermore,  the  strong 
interconnections between precuneus and prefrontal cortex (BA 8, 9, 46) on the one hand 
and between precuneus and supplementary motor areas (SMA) and anterior cingulate 
cortex  on  the  other  hand  (Cavada  & Goldman-Rakic,  1989;  Goldman-Rakic,  1988; 
Leichnetz,  2001;  Petrides  &  Pandya,  1984)  could  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
precuneus is not only involved in memory tasks but also in emotional processes such as 
empathy.  All  the  mentioned qualities  of  the  precuneus are  very compatible  with  its 
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activation during a moral conflict decision-making task as used in this study. 
So, how can precuneus activation in the moral > neutral conflict be interpreted in 
psychopaths? First,  precuneus activation in moral reasoning was already revealed in 
several studies that investigated moral dilemmas, moral judgments or realistic moral 
conflicts  in  healthy individuals  (Greene  et  al.,  2001;  Moll  et  al.,  2001;  Moll  et  al., 
2002a;  Moll  et  al.,  2002b;  Sommer et  al.,  2010).  The findings  of  the present  study 
extend  precuneus  involvement  in  moral  reasoning  from  healthy  individuals  to 
psychopathic individuals. Moral conflicts compared to neutral conflicts seem to induce 
a  higher  activation of  precuneus  associated functions  such as  episodic memory and 
emotion  integration  in  moral  decision-making.  The  combination  of  emotional 
detachment in psychopaths, as for example a lack of empathy, and precuneus activation 
as an area that is known to be involved in the integration of emotions in social situations 
leads  to  the  conclusion  that  emotion  processing  deficiency in  psychopaths  is  more 
related to behavioral deficiencies than to deficient neural correlates in the precuneus 
area. 
A similar role in emotion processing plays the neighboring brain region, the posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC; BA 31). Maddock et al. (2003) examined the role of PCC in 
emotional  processing  and  showed  that  PCC  activated  significantly  more  during 
evaluating  emotionally  unpleasant  as  well  as  during  emotionally  pleasant  arousing 
words in comparison to emotionally neutral words (Maddock et al., 2003). These results 
in combination with the fact that PCC receives strong afferent inputs from brain areas 
which are known to play an important role in emotion and social  behavior,  such as 
ACC, orbitofrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus, 
lead to the conclusion that PCC is crucially involved in emotion processing. Vogt (2005) 
emphasizes  this  role  by describing the PCC as  an  “emotional  pre-processor”  (Vogt,
2005). In accordance with these findings in healthy individuals are the results of Kiehl 
et al. (2001), who found decreased activity in PCC in psychopathic individuals during 
the processing of affect- and emotion-related words (Kiehl et al., 2001).
In addition to the emotion-related functions, PCC has memory-related functions, not 
only in episodic memory (like precuneus) but also in the mediation between emotion 
and memory-related processes (Maddock et al., 2003).
So, in the moral > neutral contrast of this study, the activation of PCC represents the 
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integration of emotion and possible emotional consequences of the decision into the 
decision-making process. This does not implicate that psychopaths are not impaired in 
emotion processing, but it seems to be due to other aspects that psychopaths differ from 
healthy individuals in their emotion processing. 
Taken together the findings of PCC and precuneus, the activation of these areas in 
the moral  conflict  condition extends findings of previous  moral  judgment studies  in 
healthy  individuals,  to  psychopathic  individuals  on  the  one  hand  and  to  realistic 
everyday moral conflicts on the other hand. In the present study, PCC and precuneus 
activation may reflect increased emotion- and memory-related processes when subjects 
judged moral conflicts compared to neutral conflicts.
5.2.1.4 Conclusion 
After  the discussion of  all  single brain areas  that  showed activation in  the moral  > 
neutral contrast in psychopaths, the aspect that all revealed brain areas are part of neural 
circuits and that in psychopaths these circuits may be deficient, is going to be discussed. 
Finally,  the  main  conclusions  of  the  findings  in  the  moral  >  neutral  conflict  in 
psychopaths are going to be summarized.
In the moral > neutral contrast, increased activation was induced in a broad network 
including the medial and superior frontal gyrus (BA 9/10, 11), the bilateral temporal 
gyrus  (BA 39/40),  the  left  middle  temporal  gyrus  (BA 21)  and  the  precuneus  and 
posterior  cingulate  cortex  (BA 31/7).  This  pattern  of  activation  reflects  results  of 
previous studies that investigated comparatively abstract moral reasoning (Greene et al., 
2001; Greene & Haidt, 2002) in healthy individuals. A study that used the same realistic  
moral conflicts as used in the present study revealed activation in a similar pattern of 
brain  regions  in  healthy  individuals  (Sommer  et  al.,  2010).  Therefore,  the  present 
findings  in  psychopaths  allow  two  conclusions.  First,  moral  reasoning  evokes  an 
activation of a similar neural network in psychopaths as in healthy individuals. This 
leads  to  the  second  conclusion  that  the  antisocial  and  impaired  affective  behavior 
observed in psychopaths may be due to a deficient interconnection of the revealed brain 
areas.  Unfortunately,  effective  connectivities  that  would  provide  further  information 
about the interaction of multiple brain areas cannot be analyzed in this fMRI study. 
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Models  that  reveal  dynamics  in  neural  systems,  such  as  dynamic  causal  modelling 
(DCM) would be helpful to provide further information about functional connectivity 
among brain areas (Friston et al., 2003; Marreiros et al., 2008). In literature, no study 
has  investigated  the  connectivity  of  brain  networks  induced  by moral  reasoning  in 
psychopaths.
In summary, the results  of the present study revealed that moral decision-making 
between a personal desire-guided and a morally-guided response induced activation of 
the medial and superior frontal gyrus, bilateral STS and TPJ, left middle temporal gyrus, 
precuneus and PCC. These findings extend previous findings on moral reasoning from 
abstract moral  reasoning to  realistic  moral conflicts  and from healthy individuals to 
psychopathic individuals. The activation of this broad neural network induced by moral 
conflicts may represent the increased emotion integration in decision-making in moral 
conflicts  when  compared  to  neutral  conflicts.  Whereas  in  healthy  individuals  the 
evaluation of the possible emotional consequences and outcomes seem to be influenced 
by  unpleasant  emotions  and  a  “bad  conscience”  that  lead  to  inhibitory  processes 
(Sommer et al., 2010), in psychopaths the processing of unpleasant emotions could be 
impaired due to  deficient  amygdala inputs.  So,  probably,  the increased activation is 
more a representation of emotionally pleasant personal consequences and outcomes that 
are  processed  when  evaluating  the  possible  outcomes  of  the  decision  than  a 
representation of unpleasant emotions. In addition to increased integration of emotions 
in moral conflicts compared to neutral conflicts, activation in the obtained brain regions 
represents increased memory-related processes and recruitment of attentional resources 
in moral conflicts. 
In sum, reasoning about realistic moral conflicts seems to involve multiple cognitive 
sub-processes  that  lead  to  an  activation  of  a  broad  neural  network  in  psychopaths. 
Though, conclusions about the intactness of the connectivity between the single brain 
areas in psychopaths cannot be drawn and further research is necessary.
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5.2.2 Contrast Immoral > Moral in Psychopathic Individuals
Besides the analysis of brain regions associated with moral versus neutral conflicts in 
psychopaths, moral conflicts were investigated in more detail. In order to identify brain 
activity  related  to  choosing  a  personal  desire-guided  response  versus  choosing  a 
morally-guided response, a second analysis was applied on the moral conflict condition. 
This  contrast  was  analyzed in  those eight  out  of  twelve  psychopathic  subjects  who 
showed a  response pattern  of  at  least  30% immoral  decisions  in  the moral  conflict 
condition. In situations in which the subjects chose the immoral personal desire-guided 
alternative,  increased activation was revealed in the medial  frontal  cortex bilaterally 
(BA 6) and the cingulate cortex bilaterally (BA 24).
In the following part, functions associated with these brain regions and the meaning 
of their involvement in the immoral condition are going to be discussed. 
First, the functions of BA 24 and its involvement in psychopathy will be described. 
Vogt et al. (1992) described the middle and anterior part of the cingulate cortex as the 
executive part of the cingulate cortex. Functions such as emotions, pain and attention 
were contributed to this part of the cingulate cortex. The reciprocal connection between 
the cingulate cortex and the amygdala further supports the affective component of the 
cingulate cortex (Vogt et al., 1992). The involvement of the cingulate cortex in affective 
and aggressive behaviors was confirmed by several studies. Therapeutic cingulotomy or 
only  small  ablative  operations  in  the  cingulum  bundle  were  used  for  treatment  of 
affective mental illnesses. Ballantine et al. (1987) summarized that this kind of therapy 
was helpful for patients with affective disorders by not only normalizing the functioning 
but also by reducing their violent behaviors (Ballantine et al., 1987). Besides the role in 
aggressive behavior, the cingulate cortex seems to be involved in emotion processing, 
especially of negative emotions. In line with this, Müller et al. (2003) revealed increased 
activation  in  right-sided  anterior  cingulate  cortex  in  psychopaths  during  processing 
pictures  with  emotionally negative  contents  (Müller  et  al.,  2003).  Summing  up the 
findings  of  previous  studies,  the  cingulate  cortex  seems to  be  crucially involved in 
aggressive behavior on the one hand and in processing negative emotions on the other 
hand. So, the activation obtained in this area when psychopaths chose the immoral and 
personal desire-guided decision in the present study, may be explained by the following 
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theories: 
First, choosing the immoral response in the moral conflicts might be associated with 
aggression-related processes in psychopaths. The aggressive component could be due to 
the attempt to fulfill a personal desire instead of behaving in a morally-guided way. 
Compared to  healthy individuals,  choosing the immoral  decision  could  be due to  a 
strong  drive  for  goal-directed  behavior  in  order  to  fulfill  a  personal  desire  in 
psychopaths. This goal directed-behavior is reflected by the activation of aggression-
related brain components. 
Besides the aggression-associated activation of the cingulate cortex,  the  cingulate 
cortex activation may reflect emotion processing mechanisms in psychopaths. Müller et 
al.  (2003)  revealed  increased  activation  of  the  anterior  cingulate  cortex  when 
psychopaths were presented with pictures with emotionally negative contents (Müller et 
al.,  2003).  In  the  present  study,  when choosing a  personal  desire-guided /  immoral 
decision, negative emotions may rise due to the negative consequences implicated by 
the  immoral  decision  for  somebody else.  Therefore,  the  activation  of  the  cingulate 
cortex during the processing of moral conflicts resulting in an immoral behavior may 
indicate  the  psychopath's  negative  emotions  that  are  associated  with  this  decision. 
Nevertheless, in psychopaths, the urge to fulfill the personal desire seems to be stronger 
than the influence of the negative emotions that could result  in an inhibition of the 
personal desire-guided decision. 
The drive to choose the hedonistic decision may further be increased by an amygdala 
deficiency in psychopaths. As already mentioned above, the amygdala is involved in 
neural circuits that underly unpleasant emotions (Lane et al., 1997; Phan et al., 2002). 
The amygdala  is  known to  be  reciprocally interconnected  with  the  cingulate  cortex 
(Vogt et al., 1992). When healthy subjects fulfill their personal desire and choose the 
immoral decision in moral conflicts, amygdala activity was revealed and interpreted as 
the activation of a “bad conscience” that indicates the subject's unpleasant emotions 
about the immoral decision (Sommer et al., 2010). In the present study, no amygdala 
activation was obtained in the immoral > moral contrast  in psychopaths.  This could 
explain a deficient interconnection between amygdala regions and cingulate cortex that 
may  result  in  a  lack  of  unpleasant  emotions  when  processing  moral  conflicts  and 
choosing the immoral decision. So, the immoral behavior may reflect the lack of a “bad 
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conscience” with the consequence that psychopaths fulfill their goal-directed behavior 
and choose the personal desire-guided response. They may process negative emotions 
concerning the consequences for the other person, but the urge to choose the hedonistic 
decision is stronger. Whereas healthy individuals seem to regret the immoral decision 
which could be explained by the activation of amygdala regions, in psychopaths a “bad 
conscience” is not detectable, at least not on neural level. 
In sum, the obtained cingulate cortex activation in psychopaths in the immoral > 
moral condition may reflect a strong drive for the fulfillment of a goal-directed and in 
this  case  immoral  behavior  that  cannot  be  inhibited  by unpleasant  emotions  as  the 
connection between amygdala and cingulate cortex may be deficient in psychopaths.
In addition to affective components of the cingulate cortex, conflict processing and 
attentional processes were contributed to the cingulate cortex. Van Veen et al. (2001) 
point out that an activation of cingulate cortex can be observed especially in situations 
when the decision-making process between the possible responses leads to a conflict 
(van  Veen  et  al.,  2001).  In  addition,  attentional  processes  were  contributed  to  the 
cingulate cortex (Vogt et al.,  1992). Therefore, the activation of the cingulate cortex 
during the processing of moral conflicts resulting in an immoral and personal desire-
guided  behavior may indicate  the  subject's  conflict  in  the  decision-making process. 
Again, the conflict in psychopaths during choosing the immoral decision may consist in 
the drive for the goal-directed behavior in order to  fulfill  a personal desire and the 
processing of negative emotions that may concern the consequences for somebody else. 
Further, the activation of the cingulate cortex may reflect higher attentional processes 
during  choosing  the  immoral  response.  This  may  be  explained  with  a  higher 
involvement of cognitive processes when deciding immorally.
Taken  together,  the  activation  of  the  cingulate  cortex  (BA 24)  in  the  immoral 
condition in psychopaths may reflect the involvement of emotion processing, conflict 
monitoring and attentional processes.  
In combination with BA 24, additional activation in the immoral > moral condition 
was revealed in BA 6. This Brodmann Area corresponds to the medial frontal cortex. 
BA 6 can be subdivided into the supplementary motor areas (SMA) and the premotor 
cortex (PM)  (Hanakawa et al.,  2002) and was known as a classical motor area,  but 
Hanakawa et al.  (2002) suppose additional non-motoric cognitive functions.  In their 
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study they revealed an involvement of BA6 in mental-operation tasks (Hanakawa et al., 
2002). According to Petit, 1998, this area is typically involved in working memory tasks 
(Petit et al., 1998). As already mentioned above, it seems that deciding immorally in a 
moral conflict induces higher attentional processes and therefore, the activation of BA 6 
as an area associated with working memory, could reflect the weighing of the conflict's 
outcomes  against  each  other.  Additionally,  BA 6  as  well  as  BA 24  activation  may 
represent  higher  cognitive  demands  that  are  associated  with  processing  of  moral 
conflicts resulting in an immoral behavior.
In conclusion, the obtained activation of BA 6/24 may reflect the strong involvement 
of cognitive and emotional processes in moral decision-making resulting in an personal 
desire-guided/immoral  response.  The  results  may  indicate  increased  attentional 
processes and a higher conflicting process in the immoral condition than in the moral 
condition. Further, an impairment of processing unpleasant emotions that may be due to 
deficient amygdala activation in psychopaths could be discussed. This may result in 
immoral and antisocial behavior that is characteristic for psychopaths, and in a lack of 
“bad conscience” when behaving and deciding immorally.
5.2.3 Contrast Moral > Neutral Comparison Between Psychopathic 
Individuals and Non-psychopathic Criminal Control Subjects
For the moral > neutral contrast, activity during conflict and question presentation in the 
neutral conflicts was subtracted from the corresponding activity in the moral conflicts in 
order to reveal brain regions associated to everyday moral reasoning. This contrast was 
analyzed in 12 psychopathic individuals and in a control group that consisted of 12 non-
psychopathic  criminal  individuals.  In  order  to  find  out  differences  on  neural  level 
between  psychopaths  and  non-psychopathic  criminal  individuals,  that  may  provide 
further information for differences between the two groups on behavioral level, brain 
areas that showed activation in the moral > neutral contrast were compared between the 
two groups.
This comparison was only possible on a descriptive but not on a  statistical  level 
because of the wide range of given immoral/moral answers within the psychopathic 
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group.   
It  was  hypothesized  that  psychopaths,  compared  to  non-psychopathic  criminal 
control subjects, would show reduced activation in brain areas associated with moral 
reasoning such as the medial and orbitofrontal gyrus, the superior temporal sulcus, the 
precuneus  and cingulate  cortex.  Based  on the  results  of  the  descriptive  comparison 
between the  two groups,  the  hypothesis  was confirmed only in  part.  Whereas  non-
psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  showed  increased  activation  in  the  middle 
temporal gyrus (BA 20/21) bilaterally, psychopaths showed activation only in the left 
middle  temporal  gyrus  (BA 21),  but  not  in  the  right.  Furthermore,  in  the  non-
psychopathic criminal control group brain activation was revealed in the superior frontal 
gyrus (BA 6) and in the cuneus area (BA 18), whereas in psychopaths there was no 
activation in these areas. Against the hypothesis, psychopaths showed activation in the 
orbitofrontal cortex (BA 10/11), whereas in non-psychopathic criminal control subjects 
activation was shown only in the medial and superior frontal gyrus (BA 9/10) but not in 
the orbitofrontal cortex. A similar pattern of activation in both groups was revealed in 
medial  and superior  frontal  gyrus  (BA 9/10),  bilateral  superior  temporal  sulcus  and 
temporo-parietal junction (STS, TPJ; BA 39/40), left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) 
and posterior cingulate (BA 31) and precuneus (BA 7).
Before discussing the differences and similarities of brain activations in the moral > 
neutral  contrast  in  psychopaths  and  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects,  the 
characteristic qualities of each of the two groups are going to be pointed out briefly. 
Whereas psychopathic individuals, who are defined as “psychopaths” due to their high 
scoring on the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R), are characterized by a lack of 
affective and interpersonal abilities on the one hand and by antisocial and social deviant 
behavior on the other hand, non-psychopathic criminal control subjects do not reach a 
very high score on the PCL-R. This is  mostly due to  low scoring on the affective-
interpersonal factor. So, as psychopaths, criminal non-psychopathic control subjects are 
characterized  by  their  criminal  and  antisocial  behavior  but,  and  in  contrast  to 
psychopaths, their behavior contains more emotional and affective features.     
Following  this  short  comparison  of  the  behavioral  characteristics  of  the  two 
investigated  groups,  in  the  next  part,  the  results  obtained  from  the  descriptive 
comparison  between  psychopathic  individuals  and  the  non-psychopathic  criminal 
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control group in the moral > neutral contrast are going to be discussed. First, brain areas 
that  showed a  similar  pattern  of  activation  in  both  groups will  be described.  Then, 
differences  in  the  activation  pattern  between  the  two  groups  will  be  discussed  and 
interpreted.
5.2.3.1 A Basic Neural Network Associated with Moral Reasoning in Psychopaths 
and Non-Psychopathic Criminal Control Subjects
In psychopathic individuals as well as in non-psychopathic criminal control subjects, 
reasoning about realistic moral conflicts induced increased activity in a broad network 
of brain regions including medial and superior frontal gyrus, bilateral STS and TPJ, left 
middle  temporal  gyrus,  posterior  cingulate  cortex  and  precuneus.  This  pattern  of 
activation reflects findings of previous studies investigating relatively abstract as well as 
realistic moral reasoning in healthy individuals (Greene et al., 2001; Greene & Haidt, 
2002; Moll et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b; Sommer et al., 2010). So, 
the present results expand previous findings from healthy individuals to psychopathic 
and non-psychopathic criminal individuals. Furthermore, it can be concluded that brain 
areas associated with moral reasoning are not only involved in reasoning about abstract 
moral  dilemmas  and  conflicts  but  also  in  relatively  realistic  and  harmless  moral 
conflicts. 
As already discussed for the moral > neutral contrast in psychopaths, activation in 
the aforementioned brain areas is related to increased integration of emotions, memory-
related  processes  and  recruitment  of  attentional  resources  in  reasoning  about  moral 
conflicts compared to reasoning about neutral conflicts (Partiot et al., 1995). This seems 
to  apply  to  realistic  moral  conflicts  in  healthy  subjects  (Sommer  et  al.,  2010),  in 
psychopaths and in non-psychopathic criminal control subjects. So, it can be concluded 
that psychopaths as well as non-psychopathic criminal individuals show activation in a 
similar pattern of brain regions which seems to be a basis of a neural network involved 
in moral reasoning and in processes related to moral reasoning.
Besides this basic neural network associated to moral reasoning that is common to 
psychopaths and non-psychopathic criminal control subjects, there are some brain areas 
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in which activation during moral decision-making differs between the two groups. In 
the  following  parts,  first,  brain  areas  that  showed  activation  in  non-psychopathic 
criminal  control  subjects  but  not  in  psychopaths  are  going  to  be  discussed.  Then, 
activation of the OFC (BA 10/11), which was only revealed in psychopaths but not in 
non-psychopathic criminal subjects, will  be discussed.  Based on these differences in 
activation between the two groups, behavioral and characteristic qualities of each group 
will be interpreted.
5.2.3.2 Lack of Activation in Right-Sided Temporal Gyrus, Superior Frontal 
Gyrus and Cuneus in Psychopaths When Compared to Non-Psychopathic 
Criminal Control Subjects
In  the  moral  conflict  condition,  non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects  showed 
activation  in  bilateral  middle  temporal  gyrus  (BA  21),  whereas  in  psychopaths 
activation was obtained only in left-sided middle temporal gyrus but not right-sided. As 
already discussed above, this  difference in activation could be explained by a right-
sided temporal lobe abnormality in psychopaths that leads to a deficiency in emotion 
processing. This theory could be explained with a general dominance of the right brain 
hemisphere in  emotional  processing (Adolphs et  al.,  1996; Kucharska-Pietura et  al., 
2003;  Leslie  et  al.,  2004).  Previous  study results  emphasize  a  right-sided  temporal 
volume loss in psychopaths and in early onset conduct disorder (Kruesi et al., 2004; 
Müller  et  al.,  2008).  In  line  with  these  previous  findings,  the  present  results  could 
indicate a right-sided temporal lobe abnormality that contributes to the pathogenesis of 
psychopathy. This would support the theory of a deficiency in emotion processing in 
psychopaths that was already proposed by several authors (Kiehl, 2006; Müller et al., 
2003; Rothmayr et al., 2010). 
In sum, the here described non-activation of the right-sided middle temporal gyrus as 
an area involved in emotion processing could emphasize the deficiency of processing 
emotional contents and the resulting lack of emotion that characterize the behavior of 
psychopaths. 
Additional to the right-sided middle temporal gyrus activation, an activation of the 
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superior frontal gyrus (Brodmann Area 6) was observed in non-psychopathic criminal 
control subjects in the moral > neutral contrast when compared on descriptive level to 
psychopathic individuals who did not show activation in this area. The superior frontal 
gyrus is known to be a classical motor area which is furthermore involved in higher 
cognitive functions and working memory (Boisgueheneuc et al., 2006; Hanakawa et al., 
2002; Petit et al., 1998). Its activation in the present study in non-psychopathic criminal 
control  subjects  could  be  explained  by the  involvement  of  working memory in  the 
processing of the conflicts. Compared to neutral conflicts, the recruitment and activation 
of the working memory is stronger when deciding in a morally relevant conflict. This 
can be explained by higher attentional processes in the moral conflict  condition.  Of 
course, it is supposed that the working memory is also activated in psychopaths during 
the processing of moral conflicts, but probably the activation in this area in psychopaths 
was not strong enough for an apparent activation in the descriptive comparison between 
both groups.
Another difference in brain activation between psychopaths and non-psychopathic 
criminal control subjects on descriptive level is the activation of Brodmann Area 18, 
corresponding to  the cuneus.  Whereas in non-psychopathic  criminal control  subjects 
this  brain region located in  the occipital  lobe showed activation,  in  psychopaths  no 
activation was revealed. The main function of the cuneus is its involvement in basic 
visual processing (Vanni et al., 2001). Thus, its activation in the present study that used 
visual presentation of the conflicts, does not surprise. However, in psychopaths, cuneus 
activation seems to be very little and as a consequence it does not appear as an area of 
activation in the descriptive comparison between both groups. Based on this minimal 
difference  in  the  activation  pattern  of  both  groups,  further  conclusions  concerning 
neural dysfunctions or disturbed functioning of the cuneus in psychopaths cannot be 
supposed and explained as there is no representable literature as scientific background.
 Summing up the activations of brain areas that were revealed in non-psychopathic 
criminal control subjects but not in psychopaths, the most important finding is a lack of 
activation in right-sided middle temporal gyrus in psychopaths. As discussed above, the 
missing activation in this area in psychopaths could be a neural correlate of a deficient 
emotion processing that characterizes the psychopaths' behavior. But it has to be taken 
into  consideration,  that  other  differences  in  activation  pattern  such  as  the  superior 
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frontal gyrus and the cuneus do not allow to draw conclusions for deficient neural brain 
areas in psychopaths. Instead,  the similarities of a basic neural network associated to 
moral reasoning that was revealed in both groups of this study have to be pointed out 
and  allude  to  the  conclusion  that  main  differences  between  both  groups  exist  on 
behavioral and not on neural level. Or, that differences on neural level are not detectable 
in  this  study,  as  they  might  be  due  to  a  deficient  connectivity  of  brain  areas  in 
psychopaths which could for example be investigated with dynamic causal modelling.
5.2.3.3 Lack of Orbitofrontal Cortex Activation in Non-Psychopathic Criminal 
Control Subjects When Compared to Psychopaths
Before drawing a general  conclusion for  the differences  in neural  activations  in the 
moral  >  neutral  contrast  for  psychopaths  and  non-psychopathic  criminal  control 
subjects, one more brain area with different activation pattern between the two groups 
has to be discussed. Against the hypothesis that in psychopaths brain areas associated to 
moral reasoning would show reduced activation, an activation of the orbitofrontal cortex 
(OFC, BA 10/11) was revealed only in psychopaths but not in the control group. At first 
sight, this seems to be a surprising finding, as the OFC is an area typically involved in 
moral reasoning in healthy individuals (Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2001; 2002a; 
2002b).  Furthermore,  Sommer  et  al.  (2010)  revealed  OFC  activation  in  healthy 
individuals in the moral > neutral contrast. In healthy individuals, functions such as the 
integration of emotions into decision-making, theory of mind, empathy and forgivability 
as well as the evaluation of possible future outcomes of a behavior are contributed to the 
OFC (Castelli et al., 2000; Gallagher et al.,  2000; Farrow et al., 2001; Partiot et al., 
1995; Walton et al., 1994).
In  the  present  study,  the  meaning  of  OFC  activation  revealed  in  psychopathic 
individuals in the moral > neutral contrast was already discussed and it was concluded 
that for psychopaths, the OFC activation can be explained by inputs from other brain 
regions  associated  to  moral  reasoning  that  compensate  deficient  amygdala  inputs 
resulting  in  impaired  emotional  behavior  and a  lack  of  unpleasant  emotions  that  is 
characteristic for psychopaths. 
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But how can the lack of activation in non-psychopathic criminal control subjects in 
the moral > neutral contrast be explained as they are not characterized by emotional 
detachment  on  behavioral  level?  First,  it  seems  possible  that  in  non-psychopathic 
criminal control subject the medial and superior frontal gyrus (BA 9/10) adopt functions 
of the OFC. And second, it has to be considered that drug abuse may confound the 
results.  In  literature,  the  association  of  drug  abuse  or  addiction  and  structural  and 
functional  changes  in  the  OFC  is  described  repeatedly  (London  et  al.,  2000; 
Schoenbaum et al., 2006). Especially the fact that even after long periods of abstinence, 
reduced baseline measurements of OFC activation were observed (Schoenbaum et al., 
2006),  could  explain  the  lack  of  OFC  activation  in  non-psychopathic  criminal 
individuals as most of them were addicted to drugs, even though they were abstinent for 
at least several months before the beginning of the study. Considering the possibility 
that previous drug abuse can confound and reduce OFC activation, it seems possible 
that in non-psychopathic criminal control subjects a combination of the effects of drugs 
on the one hand and a general dominance of the medial and superior frontal gyrus lead 
to the lack of OFC activation compared to psychopathic individuals.
5.2.3.4 Conclusion of the Descriptive Comparison Between Psychopaths and Non-
Psychopathic Criminal Control Subjects for the Moral > Neutral Contrast 
After  the  description  and discussion  of  brain  areas  that  showed different  or  similar 
activations in psychopaths and non-psychopathic criminal control subjects in the moral 
> neutral contrast, several conclusions should be summarized and emphasized. First, the 
activation of a basic neural network that is already known to be associated to moral 
reasoning in  healthy individuals  (Greene  & Haidt,  2002;  Sommer  et  al.,  2010)  was 
revealed in psychopaths as well as in non-psychopathic criminal control subjects. On 
the one hand, this leads to the conclusion that regardless of the grade of criminality and 
emotional  detachment,  in  healthy  individuals  as  well  as  in  psychopathic  and  non-
psychopathic  criminal  subjects  a  neural  network  including  the  medial  and  superior 
frontal  cortex  (BA  9/10),  bilateral  superior  temporal  sulcus  and  temporo-parietal 
junction (BA 39/40), left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21) and posterior cingulate cortex 
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(BA 31) shows activation when subjects have to decide in a moral conflict compared to 
a neutral conflict. On the other hand, the simple activation of this basic neural network 
does  not  allow  to  draw  any  conclusions  about  the  intactness  of  the  functional 
connectivity between the single brain areas. 
Besides  the  similarities  of  brain  activation  in  psychopaths  and  non-psychopathic 
criminal control subjects, the most important difference is the lack of activation in right-
sided middle temporal gyrus in psychopaths compared to non-psychopathic criminal 
control subjects. As the right brain hemisphere in general and this area in particular are 
involved in emotion processing, the non-activation of this area in psychopaths could 
emphasize their deficiency of processing emotional contents and the resulting lack of 
emotion that is characteristic for psychopaths. 
It can be concluded that except for the just mentioned non-activation of right-sided 
middle  temporal  gyrus  in  psychopaths  that  may  indicate  the  neural  basis  of  the 
emotional deficient behavior of psychopaths, it seems that on neural level, differences 
between the two groups cannot be revealed with fMRI but need to be investigated with 
other methods such as DCM. 
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5.3 Conclusion and Outlook
This  study  aimed  at  investigating  the  neural  underpinnings  of  decision-making  in 
realistic moral conflicts in psychopaths. Whereas the neural correlates of morality and 
moral decision-making in healthy individuals as well as the neural basis of emotional 
processing in psychopaths are relatively well studied, the neural basis of moral decision-
making  in  psychopaths  is  poorly  understood.  So,  this  is  the  first  fMRI  study  that 
presented stories with moral or neutral  (morally irrelevant)  conflicts to psychopathic 
individuals  in  order  to  reveal  neural  processes  associated  with  decision-making  in 
everyday moral conflicts. In order to increase the informative value, the results of the 
psychopathic  group were  compared to  those of  a  non-psychopathic  criminal  control 
group.
On behavioral level, the main findings of the present study consisted of a statistical 
tendency towards more immoral decisions and significantly higher emotion ratings in 
the psychopathic group when deciding immorally compared to the non-psychopathic 
criminal control group. Therefore, it was concluded that psychopaths are not influenced 
and inhibited by unpleasant emotions or a “bad conscience” when choosing an immoral 
decision. And even if they know that the decision they choose is socially not desired, 
they  do  not  care  neither  about  this  knowledge  nor  about  the  consequences  of  this 
decision.  Thus,  psychopaths  differ  from non-psychopathic  criminal  control  subjects 
mainly by their  poor involvement of emotions in moral decision-making of realistic 
moral  conflicts.  Additionally,  the  inhomogeneity  within  the  psychopathic  group 
concerning  the  chosen  decisions  which  emphasizes  the  diversity  of  emotional 
detachment in the group of psychopaths has to be pointed out again.
In order to investigate the neural correlates of decision-making in everyday moral 
conflicts  in  psychopaths  in  this  fMRI  study,  brain  activity  in  the  neutral  conflicts 
condition  was  subtracted  from  the  corresponding  activity  in  the  moral  conflicts 
condition.  A  broad  neural  network  that  showed  increased  activation  consisted  of 
bilateral  medial and superior frontal areas (BA 9/10/11), bilateral superior temporal and 
supramarginal gyrus (BA 39), left middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), and the posterior 
cingulate and precuneus region (BA 7/31). All of these brain regions are known to be 
involved in decision-making of moral dilemmas and simple moral judgments as well as 
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in decision-making of everyday moral conflicts in healthy subjects ( Greene et al., 2001; 
Greene & Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2002a; Moll et al., 2002b; Sommer 
et al., 2010). Therefore, it was shown that in psychopaths, decision-making in realistic 
and everyday moral  conflicts  activates  the  same basic  neural  network as  in  healthy 
subjects. The same basic pattern of activation was revealed for the non-psychopathic 
criminal  control  group.  As  all  of  the  mentioned  brain  areas  are  involved  in  the 
integration of emotion in moral decision-making, in higher attentional processes and in 
social perception processing, it was discussed that the similar pattern of activation in 
psychopaths as in healthy and non-psychopathic criminals may be due to a deficient 
interconnection among the single brain areas and to deficient inputs from limbic areas 
such as the amygdala. But with these findings as a basis, further research could use 
models such as dynamic causal modelling (DCM) in order to infer direct connectivity 
among the single brain areas involved in moral decision-making.
A descriptive comparison of the activated brain areas in the moral > neutral condition 
in psychopaths and non-psychopathic criminal individuals showed that besides a very 
similar pattern of activation (as mentioned above), psychopaths differed from control 
subjects in a missing activation in the right-sided middle temporal gyrus which may 
indicate  a  neural  basis  of  the  emotional  detachment  that  is  characteristic  for 
psychopaths.  But  summing  up,  the  differences  between  the  two  groups  are  more 
perceptible on behavioral level than on neural level. Of course, this can again be due to 
a deficiency in the connections of the neural network in psychopaths which could not be 
investigated in this study.
In addition to the moral > neutral contrast that revealed brain areas implicated in 
everyday moral reasoning, neural correlates related to choosing a personal desire-guided 
immoral response over a moral response were identified in psychopaths and revealed 
increased activation in the medial frontal cortex bilaterally (BA 6) and the cingulate 
cortex bilaterally (BA 24). This activation pattern reflects  the strong involvement of 
cognitive and emotional processes in moral decision-making resulting in an immoral 
response and indicates increased attentional processes and a higher conflicting process 
in  the immoral  condition than  in  the  moral  condition.  In  this  context,  once  more a 
deficient input from the amygdala was discussed that may result in an impairment of 
processing unpleasant emotions on neural level and in immoral and antisocial behavior 
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on behavioral level. 
Taken together, the present study provides a better understanding of everyday moral 
decision-making and its  neural  underpinnings  in psychopaths.  Further,  it  shows that 
whereas  psychopaths  are  characterized by their  emotional  detachment  on behavioral 
level, differences on neural level could be explained by a deficient emotion processing 
due to impaired connectivity among single brain areas, especially with the amygdala.
By investigating the neural and behavioral correlates of moral decision-making of 
psychopaths in everyday moral conflicts, this study closes a gap in scientific literature 
on the one hand, but on the other hand several new questions raise from the present 
findings. Therefore, in future research the interconnectivity among the single brain areas 
associated with moral decision-making in psychopaths has to be clarified.
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9 Zusammenfassung
Neuronale Korrelate moralischen Urteilens bei Psychopathen
-
Eine fMRT-Studie
Während mit Hilfe der fortschreitenden Entwicklung in der medizinischen Bildgebung 
durch die funktionelle Magnetresonanztomographie (fMRT) die neuronalen Grundlagen 
moralischen Urteilens bei gesunden Probanden weitgehend gut untersucht sind, gibt es 
hierzu  kaum  Studien  an  Patienten  mit  dem  psychischen  Störungsbild  der 
„Psychopathie“. Diese Patienten sind charakterisiert durch emotionale Abgestumpftheit, 
Impulsivität und Aggressivität sowie durch unmoralisches Verhalten im Alltag. 
Die  vorliegende  fMRT-Studie  untersucht  das  moralische  Urteilen  und  dessen 
neuronale Grundlagen bei „Psychopathen“ sowie bei einer aus nicht-psychopathischen 
forensischen  Patienten  bestehenden  Kontrollgruppe.  Die  beiden  jeweils  aus  12 
männlichen Probanden bestehenden Gruppen unterschieden sich durch die Höhe ihrer 
erreichten  Punkte  auf  der  Psychopathy  Checklist-Revised  (PCL-R).  Während  die 
Probanden der psychopathischen Gruppe einen PCL-R-Wert von über  26 aufwiesen, 
wiesen die  Probanden der nicht-psychopathischen forensischen Kontrollgruppe einen 
PCL-R-Wert von unter 16 auf. Um die neuronalen Korrelate moralischen Urteilens in 
beiden Gruppen zu untersuchen, wurden allen Probanden 56 realistische und alltägliche 
Konflikte präsentiert.  28 dieser Konflikte bestanden aus moralischen Konflikten,  bei 
denen die Probanden zwischen einem persönlichen Bedürfnis (unmoralische Antwort) 
und der Erfüllung einer ethischen Norm (moralische Antwort) entscheiden mussten. Die 
anderen  28  Konflikte  waren  neutralen  Inhalts  und  erforderten  eine  Entscheidung 
zwischen  zwei  persönlichen  Bedürfnissen.  Alle  Konflikte  wurden  den  Probanden 
schriftlich  und  in  randomisierter  Reihenfolge  im  MRT  präsentiert.  Die  Probanden 
wurden aufgefordert, sich nach jedem Konflikt auf die Frage „wie verhalte ich mich?“ 
für eine der dargebotenen Antwortmöglichkeiten zu entscheiden. Im Anschluss an die 
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Messung im MRT wurden die Probanden gebeten, in einem schriftlichen Fragebogen zu 
allen Konflikten den Grad ihrer mit der Entscheidung verbundenen Sicherheit sowie 
ihre damit verbundenen Gefühle auf einer 5-stufigen Skala von „sehr gut / sehr sicher“ 
bis „sehr schlecht / sehr unsicher“ anzugeben. 
Die Auswertung der Ergebnisse auf Verhaltensebene zeigte eine statistische Tendenz 
zu mehr unmoralischen Entscheidungen innerhalb der moralischen Konflikte bei den 
psychopathischen Probanden im Vergleich zu den nicht-psychopathischen forensischen 
Kontrollen. Des weiteren ergaben sich sowohl in der psychopathischen als auch in der 
nicht-psychopathischen  forensischen  Kontrollgruppe  innerhalb  der  moralischen 
Konflikte  signifikant  schlechtere Gefühle  und signifikant  weniger  Sicherheit  bei  der 
Entscheidung  für  eine  unmoralische  Antwort  im  Vergleich  zu  einer  moralischen 
Antwort.  Im statistischen Vergleich zwischen beiden Gruppen zeigte  sich allerdings, 
dass  sich  Psychopathen  bei  unmoralischen  Entscheidungen  signifikant  weniger 
emotional beeinträchtigt fühlen als die nicht-psychopathischen forensischen Kontrollen.
Um  die  Gehirnareale  festzustellen,  die  an  moralischem  Urteilen  alltäglicher 
Konflikte  beteiligt  sind,  wurde  die  Aktivität,  die  während  der  neutralen  Konflikte 
gemessen wurde von der entsprechenden Aktivität während der moralischen Konflikte 
abgezogen.  Für  diesen  Kontrast  ergab  sich  für  die  psychopathische  Gruppe  eine 
signifikante  Aktivierung  in  den  folgenden  Arealen  eines  fronto-temporo-parietalen 
Netzwerks: medialer und superiorer frontaler Gyrus (BA 9/10/11), superiorer temporaler 
und supramarginaler Gyrus beidseits (BA 39/40), linker mittlerer temporaler Gyrus (BA 
21) sowie im Gyrus cinguli (BA 31) und Precuneus (BA 7) beidseits. Diese Ergebnisse 
wurden  auf  deskriptiver  Ebene  mit  denen  der  nicht-psychopathischen  forensischen 
Kontrollgruppe für den Kontrast  moralische > neutrale Konflikte verglichen. Hierbei 
zeigte  sich  in  beiden  Gruppen  ein  ähnliches  Aktivierungsmuster  im  medialen  und 
superioren  frontalen  Gyrus  (BA 9/10),  im  superioren  temporalen  Sulcus  und  der 
temporoparietalen Junction beidseits (BA 39/40), im linken temporalen Gyrus (BA 21) 
sowie im posterioren Cingulum und im Precuneus (BA 31/7). Dagegen unterschieden 
sich die beiden Gruppen in der Aktivierung des orbitofrontalen Kortex (BA 10/11), der 
nur innerhalb der psychopathischen Gruppe eine Aktivität zeigte. Im Gegensatz dazu 
wurden in der nicht-psychopathischen forensischen Kontrollgruppe Aktivierungen im 
Bereich des rechten temporalen Gyrus (BA 21), sowie des superior frontalen Gyrus (BA 
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6)  und  des  Cuneus  (BA 18)  beobachtet,  wohingegen  sich  in  der  psychopathischen 
Gruppe in diesen Gehirnarealen keine Aktivierung zeigte. 
Zusätzlich zu der Analyse der Gehirnareale, die mit moralischem im Vergleich zu 
neutralem Urteilen assoziiert sind, wurde eine genauere Untersuchung der moralischen 
Konflikte innerhalb der psychopathischen Gruppe durchgeführt. Das Ziel dieser zweiten 
Analyse  war,  die  Gehirnareale  festzustellen,  die  mit  Entscheidungen  für  ein 
persönliches (unmoralisches) Bedürfnis im Vergleich zu den Entscheidungen für eine 
ethische (moralische) Norm assoziiert sind. Dieser Vergleich wurde mit den 8 der 12 
psychopathischen  Probanden  gerechnet,  die  ein  Antwortmuster  von  mehr  als  30% 
unmoralischer  Antworten innerhalb der moralischen Konflikte zeigten.  Das Ergebnis 
dieses Vergleichs war eine signifikante Aktivierung im medialen frontalen Gyrus und im 
Gyrus cinguli beidseits (BA 6/24).
Die Ergebnisse dieser Studie liefern einen wichtigen Beitrag zum Verständnis des 
Störungsbildes  der „Psychopathie“  -  sowohl auf  Verhaltens-  als  auch auf  neuronaler 
Ebene. Auf Verhaltensebene unterstreichen die Ergebnisse den klinischen Unterschied 
zwischen Psychopathen und nicht-psychopathischen Kriminellen.  Während für  beide 
Gruppen  ein  antisoziales  und  kriminelles,  aggressives  Verhalten  typisch  ist,  sind 
Psychopathen  darüber  hinaus  typischerweise  durch  ihre  emotionale  Abgestumpftheit 
charakterisiert. Dass sich Psychopathen in den moralischen Konflikten der vorliegenden 
Studie  tendenziell  häufiger  unmoralisch  entscheiden  als  ihre  nicht-psychopathischen 
kriminellen  Kontrollen  und  sich  dabei  auch  noch  weniger  emotional  beeinträchtigt 
fühlen als die Kontrollprobanden, spricht stark für eine emotionale Beeinträchtigung bei 
Psychopathen. Es kann davon ausgegangen werden, dass Psychopathen im Vergleich zu 
nicht-psychopathischen  forensischen  Kontrollen  bei  der  Entscheidung  für  eine 
unmoralische  Option  weniger  durch  unangenehme,  negative  Gefühle  beeinflusst 
werden,  die  im Sinne  eines  „schlechten  Gewissens“  die  unmoralische  Entscheidung 
inhibieren würden.
Die Resultate der Untersuchung im fMRT tragen ebenfalls einen großen Teil zum 
besseren  Verständnis  der  neuronalen  Grundlagen  moralischen  Urteilens  bei 
Psychopathen  und  nicht-psychopathischen  forensischen  Patienten  bei.  Ein  wichtiges 
Ergebnis  dieser  Studie  ist,  dass  bei  Psychopathen  ein  ähnliches  Netzwerk  an 
Gehirnarealen beim moralischen Urteilen aktiviert wie es bereits aus mehreren Studien 
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an  gesunden  Probanden  bekannt  ist.  Das  führt  zu  der  Schlussfolgerung,  das  die 
realistischen,  alltäglichen  moralischen  Konflikte,  die  in  der  vorliegenden  Studie 
verwendet wurden, auch dazu geeignet sind, Gehirnareale zu aktivieren, die bisher vor 
allem bei der Beurteilung moralischer Dilemmata bei gesunden Probanden Aktivierung 
zeigten.  Allerdings  darf  aus  diesem  ähnlichen  Aktivierungsmuster  weder  auf  eine 
intakte  Funktion  der  jeweiligen  Gehirnareale  noch  auf  eine  intakte  Interaktion  der 
Areale  bei  Psychopathen  geschlossen  werden.  So  kann  die  Aktivierung  des 
orbitofrontalen Kortex bei moralischen > neutralen Konflikten bei Psychopathen unter 
anderem auf vermehrte Inputs von anderen, z.B. benachbarten Hirnarealen hinweisen, 
die  die  fehlenden  beziehungsweise  defekten  Inputs  von  Seiten  der  Amygdala 
kompensieren.  Diese  Minderaktivierung  der  Amygdala  könnte  außerdem  die 
Affektverflachung und das typische unmoralische und emotional kalte Verhalten von 
Psychopathen  erklären.  Auch  die  beobachtete  Aktivierung  der  temporo-parietalen 
Junction (TPJ; BA 39/40) bei Psychopathen erlaubt keinen Rückschluss auf eine intakte 
Funktion  dieses  Areals,  wie  zum  Beispiel  die  Fähigkeit,  sich  in  andere  Personen 
hineinzuversetzen. Die Ergebnisse führen also zu der Annahme, dass bei Psychopathen 
die Verbindungen zwischen den einzelnen, mit moralischen Entscheidungen assoziierten 
Gehirnarealen nicht intakt sind. Leider können diese Verbindungen und Verschaltungen 
mit Hilfe des fMRT nicht untersucht werden. Hierfür müssten Techniken wie dynamic 
causal modelling (DCM) verwendet werden um weitere Aussagen treffen zu können. 
Auch  für  den  Vergleich  zwischen  Psychopathen  und  nicht-psychopathischen 
forensischen  Kontrollen  gilt  ähnliches.  Beide  Gruppen  weisen  ein  ähnliches 
Aktivierungsmuster  auf,  was  darauf  hinweist,  dass  die  unterschiedlichen 
Verhaltensmuster beider Gruppen vor allem auf einer funktionell gestörten Verbindung 
zwischen den einzelnen Hirnarealen bei Psychopathen beruhen. Während allerdings bei 
den  nicht-psychopathischen  forensischen  Kontrollen  eine  Aktivierung  der  mittleren 
temporalen  Gyrus  (BA 21)  beidseits  festgestellt  werden  kann,  lässt  sich  diese  bei 
Psychopathen nur linksseitig beobachten. Dieses Ergebnis erlaubt die Schlussfolgerung, 
dass möglicherweise bei Psychopathen die rechte Hemisphäre und speziell der rechte 
Temporallappen,  die  mit  Emotionsverarbeitung  assoziiert  sind,  funktionelle 
Einschränkungen  aufweisen.  Auch  das  würde  die  emotionale  Abgestumpftheit  bei 
Psychopathen weiter unterstreichen. Zusammenfassend  lässt  sich  festhalten,  dass  die 
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Zusammenfassung
Ergebnisse dieser Studie die fehlende Emotionalität von Psychopathen, vor allem im 
Vergleich  zu  nicht-psychopathischen  forensischen  Probanden,  sowohl  auf 
Verhaltensebene  als  auch  auf  neuronaler  Ebene  unterstreichen.  Bei  den  neuronalen 
Grundlagen  moralischen  Urteilens  bei  Psychopathen  scheinen  besonders  die 
Verbindungen zwischen den einzelnen Gehirnarealen beeinträchtigt zu sein, vor allem 
was die Inputs von Seiten der Amygdala betrifft. So bildet diese Studie einen wertvollen 
Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis der Psychopathie und ihrer neuronalen Korrelate und 
schafft darüberhinaus die Grundlagen für zukünftige Studien.
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